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38 posts on "Banks"

October 18, 2017

What Explains Shareholder Payouts by Large Banks?



Editor's note: This post has been corrected to show that the $750 billion increase in common equity at CCAR banks since 2009 reflects a rise of more than 150 percent. (October 20, 2017, 2:06 p.m.)

LSE_2017_What Explains Shareholder Payouts by Large Banks?

On June 28, the Federal Reserve released the latest results of the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR), the supervisory program that assesses the capital adequacy and capital planning processes of large, complex banking companies. The Fed did not object to any of the banks’ capital plans, an outcome that was widely heralded as a signal that these banks would be able to increase payouts to their shareholders. And in fact, immediately following the release of the CCAR results, several large banks announced substantial increases in quarterly dividends and record-sized share repurchase programs. In this post, we put these announced increases into recent historical context, showing how banks’ payouts to shareholders have increased since the financial crisis and describing how CCAR has affected the composition of payouts between dividends and share repurchases.

Continue reading "What Explains Shareholder Payouts by Large Banks?" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Bank Capital, Banks, Financial Institutions | Permalink | Comments (0)

September 06, 2017

What Drives International Bank Credit?



LSE_2017_What Drives International Bank Credit?

A major question facing policymakers is how to deal with slumps in bank credit. The policy prescriptions are very different depending on whether the decline is a result of global forces, domestic demand, or supply problems in a particular banking system. We present findings from new research that exactly decompose the growth in banks’ aggregate foreign credit into these three factors. Using global banking data for the period 2000-16, we uncover some striking patterns in bilateral credit relationships between consolidated banking systems and borrowers in more than 200 countries. The most important we term the “Anna Karenina Principle” of global banking: all healthy credit relationships behave alike; each unhealthy credit relationship is unhealthy in its own way.

Continue reading "What Drives International Bank Credit?" »

August 09, 2017

Investor Diversity and Liquidity in the Secondary Loan Market



LSE_Investor Diversity and Liquidity in the Secondary Loan Market

Over the last two decades, the U.S. secondary loan market has evolved from a relatively sleepy market dominated by banks and insurance companies that trade only occasionally to a more active market comprising a diversified set of institutional investors, including collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), loan mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, brokers, and private equity firms. This shift resulted from the growing presence of these investors in the syndicates of corporate loans, as shown in the chart below. In 1991 the average term loan had just two different types of investors; by 2013 that number had grown to five.

Continue reading "Investor Diversity and Liquidity in the Secondary Loan Market" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Financial Markets | Permalink | Comments (0)

August 07, 2017

Regulatory Incentives and Quarter-End Dynamics in the Repo Market



LSE_Regulatory Incentives and Quarter-End Dynamics in the Repo Market

Since the global financial crisis, central bankers and other prudential authorities have been working to design and implement new banking regulations, known as Basel III, to reduce risk in the financial sector. Although most features of the Basel III regime are implemented consistently across jurisdictions, some important details vary. In particular, banks headquartered in the euro area, Switzerland, and Japan report their leverage ratios—essentially, capital divided by total consolidated assets—as a snapshot of their value on the last day of the quarter. In contrast, institutions headquartered in the United States and the United Kingdom report most leverage ratio components as averages of their daily values over the quarter. In this post, we study the impact of this difference in regulatory implementation on rates and quantities borrowed in the U.S. repo market.

Continue reading "Regulatory Incentives and Quarter-End Dynamics in the Repo Market" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Financial Markets, Repo | Permalink | Comments (2)

August 02, 2017

Were Banks Ever ‘Boring’?



LSE_Were Banks Ever ‘Boring’?

In a previous post, I documented that much of the expansion into nontraditional activities by U.S. banks began well before the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, the legislation that repealed much of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The historical record actually contains many prior instances of the Glass-Steagall restrictions being circumvented, with nonbank firms allowed to operate as financial conglomerates and engage in activities that go beyond traditional banking. These broad industry dynamics might indicate that the business of banking tends to expand firm boundaries beyond a
traditional—“boring”—perimeter.

Continue reading "Were Banks Ever ‘Boring’?" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Financial Institutions, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (2)

July 31, 2017

Were Banks ‘Boring’ before the Repeal of Glass-Steagall?



LSE_Were Banks ‘Boring’ before the Repeal of Glass-Steagall?

Since the global financial crisis and Great Recession, many critics have called for regulatory and legislative reforms to restore a system of “boring” banks constrained to traditional banking activities like deposit taking and lending. The narrative underlying this argument holds that the partial repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act enabled banks to expand into nontraditional activities such as securities trading and underwriting, thereby contributing to the financial crisis some ten years later. The implication is that if we could restore the Glass-Steagall Act, banks would become boring once again, and financial stability would be enhanced. The reality, however, may be more complex; an in-depth look “under the hood” of banks’ organizational structure over the past forty years shows that bank holding companies (BHCs) began expanding into those financial activities in the early 1980s and that this expansion was, in fact, nearly complete by 1999.

Continue reading "Were Banks ‘Boring’ before the Repeal of Glass-Steagall?" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Financial Institutions, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (3)

June 21, 2017

Low Interest Rates and Bank Profits



LSE_Low Interest Rates and Bank Profits

The Fed’s December 2015 decision to raise interest rates after an unprecedented seven-year stasis offers a chance to assess the link between interest rates and bank profitability. A key determinant of a bank’s profitability is its net interest margin (NIM)—the gap between an institution’s interest income and interest expense, typically normalized by the average size of its interest-earning assets. The aggregate NIM for the largest U.S. banks reached historic lows in the fourth quarter of 2015, coinciding with the “low for long” interest rate environment in place since the financial crisis. When interest rates fall, interest income and interest expenses tend to fall as well, but the relative changes—and the impact on NIM—are less clear. In this post, we explore how NIM fell during the low-interest-rate period, finding that banks mitigated some, but not all, of the impact of lower rates by shifting into less costly types of liabilities. Our analysis also gives insight into how NIM may respond to the new rising interest rate environment.

Continue reading "Low Interest Rates and Bank Profits" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Financial Institutions | Permalink | Comments (6)

June 01, 2017

Just Released: Bank Loan Performance Under the Magnifying Glass



LS_2017_Just Released:  Bank Loan Performance Under the Magnifying Glass

The New York Fed’s recently released Quarterly Trends for Consolidated U.S. Banking Organizations (QT report) confirms that bank loan portfolios look a lot healthier than they did just a few years ago, reflecting the sustained economic recovery from the Great Recession. In this post, we sharpen the focus to look at bank loan performance in more detail, using more disaggregated charts added to the QT report this quarter.

Continue reading "Just Released: Bank Loan Performance Under the Magnifying Glass" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Mortgages | Permalink | Comments (0)

April 10, 2017

Financial Crises and the Desirability of Macroprudential Policy



LSE_Financial Crises and the Desirability of Macroprudential Policy

The global financial crisis has put financial stability risks—and the potential role of macroprudential policies in addressing them—at the forefront of policy debates. The challenge for macroeconomists is to develop new models that are consistent with the data while being able to capture the highly nonlinear nature of crisis episodes. In this post, we evaluate the impact of a macroprudential policy that has the government tilt incentives for banks to encourage them to build up their equity positions. The government has a role since individual banks do not internalize the systemic benefit of having more bank equity. Our model allows for an evaluation of the tradeoff between the size of such incentives and the probability of a future financial crisis.

Continue reading "Financial Crises and the Desirability of Macroprudential Policy" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Credit, DSGE, Financial Intermediation, Great Recession | Permalink | Comments (0)

February 22, 2017

Getting More from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey?



LSE_2017_Getting More from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey?

Every quarter, senior loan officers at selected large banks around the United States are asked by Fed economists how their standards for approving business loans changed compared with the quarter before. Of all the questions in the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS), responses to that question about standards usually attract the most attention from the financial press and researchers. Relatively ignored by comparison are loan officers’ reports on how they changed interest spreads, collateral requirements, and other terms on loans they are willing to approve. Lenders can clearly expand or contract credit by altering those terms even without changing their standards for approving loans, so we investigate whether the reports on loan terms collected in the SLOOS are also informative.

Continue reading "Getting More from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey? " »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Financial Institutions | Permalink | Comments (0)
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