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28 posts on "Crisis"

October 16, 2018

Liquidity Effects of Post-Crisis Regulatory Reform



LSE_2018_Liquidity Effects of Post-Crisis Regulatory Reform

The post-crisis regulatory reform efforts to improve capital and liquidity positions of regulated institutions provide incentives for banks to change not only the structure of their own balance sheets but also how they interact with their customers and other market participants more generally. A 2015 PwC study on global financial market liquidity, for example, noted that “[a]s banks respond to the new regulatory environment, they have sought to make more efficient use of capital and liquidity resources, by reducing the markets they serve and streamlining their operations.” In this blog post, we provide an overview of three recent New York Fed staff reports that study the impact that post-crisis regulation has had on the willingness and ability of regulated firms to participate in U.S. over-the-counter (OTC) markets.

Continue reading "Liquidity Effects of Post-Crisis Regulatory Reform" »

October 02, 2018

Resolving “Too Big to Fail”



LSE_Resolving “Too Big to Fail”

Many market participants believe that large financial institutions enjoy an implicit guarantee that the government will step in to rescue them from potential failure. These “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) issues became particularly salient during the 2008 crisis. From the government’s perspective, rescuing these financial institutions can be important to avoid harm to the financial system. The bailouts also artificially lower the risk borne by investors and the financing costs of big banks. The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to remove the incentive for governments to bail out banks in the first place by mandating that each large bank file a “living will” that details its strategy for a rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material distress or failure without disrupting the broader economy. In our recent New York Fed staff report, we look at whether living wills are effective at reducing the cost of implicit TBTF bailout subsidies.

Continue reading "Resolving “Too Big to Fail”" »

October 01, 2018

Regulatory Changes and the Cost of Capital for Banks



LSE_Regulatory Changes and the Cost of Capital for Banks

In response to the financial crisis nearly a decade ago, a number of regulations were passed to improve the safety and soundness of the financial system. In this post and our related staff report, we provide a new perspective on the effect of these regulations by estimating the cost of capital for banks over the past two decades. We find that, while banks’ cost of capital soared during the financial crisis, after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA), banks experienced a greater decrease in their cost of capital than nonbanks and nonbank financial intermediaries (NBFI).

Continue reading "Regulatory Changes and the Cost of Capital for Banks" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:02 AM in Bank Capital, Banks, Corporate Finance, Crisis, Dodd-Frank | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Effects of Post-Crisis Banking Reforms



LSE_The Effects of Post-Crisis Banking Reforms

The financial crisis of 2007-08 exposed many limitations of the regulatory architecture of the U.S. financial system. In an attempt to mitigate these limitations, there has been a wave of regulatory reforms in the post-crisis period, especially in the banking sector. These include tighter bank capital and liquidity rules; new resolution procedures for failed banks; the creation of a stand-alone consumer protection agency; greater transparency in money market funds; and a move to central clearing of derivatives, among other measures. As these reforms have been finalized and implemented, a healthy debate has emerged in the policy and academic communities over the degree to which they have achieved their intended goals and the extent of any unintended consequences that might have arisen in the process.

Continue reading "The Effects of Post-Crisis Banking Reforms" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Crisis | Permalink | Comments (0)

May 30, 2018

Good News, Leverage, and Sudden Stops



LSE_Good News, Leverage, and Sudden Stops


One of the major debates in open economy macroeconomics is the extent to which capital inflows are beneficial for growth. In principle, these flows allow countries to increase their consumption and investment spending beyond their income by enabling them to tap into foreign saving. Periods of such borrowing, however, are associated with large trade deficits, external debt accumulation, and, in some cases, overheating when these economies operate beyond their potential output level for an extended period of time. The relevant question in this context is whether the rate at which a country is taking on external debt has useful predictive information about financial crises.

Continue reading "Good News, Leverage, and Sudden Stops" »

April 02, 2018

Quantities and Prices during the Housing Bust



LSE_2018_Quantities and Prices during the Housing Bust

The recent U.S. housing crisis featured explosive growth and collapse of house prices at the national level, with substantial boom-bust pattern variation at the local level. What is less commonly known in the housing market is the behavior of housing quantities. While measures of supply and inventory play an important role in understanding markets, quantity data in housing is traditionally limited to national aggregates. Using a rich new data set of homes listed for sale across a wide range of U.S. housing markets, this post explores whether the collapse in prices from 2006 to 2009 owed more to a flood of houses on the market (higher supply) or a dearth of sales (lower demand).

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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis, Housing | Permalink | Comments (0)

March 05, 2018

Did the Dodd-Frank Act End ‘Too Big to Fail’?



LSE_Did the Dodd-Frank Act End ‘Too Big to Fail’?

One goal of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was to end “too big to fail.” Toward that goal, the Act required systemically important financial institutions to submit detailed plans for an orderly resolution (“living wills”) and authorized the FDIC to create an alternative resolution procedure. In response, the FDIC has developed a “single point of entry” (SPOE) strategy, under which healthy parent companies bear the losses of their failing subsidiaries. Since SPOE makes the parent company responsible for subsidiaries’ losses, we would expect that parents have become riskier, relative to their subsidiaries, since the announcement of the SPOE strategy in December 2013. Do bond raters and investors share this view?

Continue reading "Did the Dodd-Frank Act End ‘Too Big to Fail’?" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Crisis, Dodd-Frank, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (4)

February 22, 2018

Just Released: Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands after Hurricanes Irma and Maria



LSE_2018_Just Released: Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands after Hurricanes Irma and Maria

An examination of the fallout from Hurricanes Irma and Maria on the economies of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands was the focus of an economic press briefing today at the New York Fed. Both U.S. territories were suffering from significant economic downturns and fiscal stress well before the storms hit in September 2017, raising concerns about their paths to recovery.

Continue reading "Just Released: Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands after Hurricanes Irma and Maria" »

September 06, 2017

What Drives International Bank Credit?



LSE_2017_What Drives International Bank Credit?

A major question facing policymakers is how to deal with slumps in bank credit. The policy prescriptions are very different depending on whether the decline is a result of global forces, domestic demand, or supply problems in a particular banking system. We present findings from new research that exactly decompose the growth in banks’ aggregate foreign credit into these three factors. Using global banking data for the period 2000-16, we uncover some striking patterns in bilateral credit relationships between consolidated banking systems and borrowers in more than 200 countries. The most important we term the “Anna Karenina Principle” of global banking: all healthy credit relationships behave alike; each unhealthy credit relationship is unhealthy in its own way.

Continue reading "What Drives International Bank Credit?" »

June 29, 2016

Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Crisis



LSE_Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Crisis

The Federal Open Market Committee implements monetary policy by raising or lowering its target for the federal funds rate, the interest rate banks charge each other for overnight loans. Because the Federal Reserve has no direct control over most interest rates, it relies on arbitrage in money markets for the change in the fed funds rate to be transmitted to other short-term rates, thus causing all short-term rates to move in tandem. This transmission to other rates is an important first step for the Fed’s actions to influence the real economy. In this post, we describe the major developments that have affected monetary policy transmission since the recent financial crisis. We conclude that while arbitrage may have been impeded at the beginning of the crisis, it currently remains effective in transmitting changes in monetary policy via the money markets.

Continue reading "Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Crisis" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis, Fed Funds, Financial Markets, Monetary Policy | Permalink | Comments (0)
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