The Federal Reserve Bank of New York works to promote sound and well-functioning financial systems and markets through its provision of industry and payment services, advancement of infrastructure reform in key markets and training and educational support to international institutions.
The New York Fed engages with individuals, households and businesses in the Second District and maintains an active dialogue in the region. The Bank gathers and shares regional economic intelligence to inform our community and policy makers, and promotes sound financial and economic decisions through community development and education programs.
Michael Fleming, Frank Keane, Michael McMorrow, Ernst Schaumburg, and Nathaniel Wuerffel
The New York Fed recently hosted a two-day conference on the evolving structure of the U.S. Treasury market, co-sponsored with the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The events of October 15, 2014, when yields experienced an unusually high level of volatility and a rapid round-trip in prices without a clear cause, underscored the need to better understand the factors that affect the liquidity and functioning of this important market.
Marco Del Negro, Marc Giannoni, Erica Moszkowski, Sara Shahanaghi, and Micah Smith
This post presents an update of the economic forecasts implied by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s (FRBNY) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, which we first introduced in a series of blog posts in September 2014. The model continues to predict a gradual recovery in economic activity, but one that will proceed at a slightly slower pace than was forecast in our April update. It also predicts a slow return of inflation toward the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) long-run target of 2 percent. This forecast remains surrounded by significant uncertainty. Please note that the DSGE model forecasts are not the official New York Fed staff forecasts, but only an input to the overall forecasting process at the Bank.
Jacob Adenbaum, Antoine Martin, and Susan McLaughlin
The tri-party repo market is a large and important market where securities dealers find a substantial amount of short-term funding. Despite its importance, this market was very opaque before the crisis. Since March 2010, in accordance with recommendation 13 of the Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform report, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has made monthly data on the tri-party repo market available to the public. Today, with our new interactive tool, there is a whole new way to view the market and its evolution. You can make your own charts, looking at volumes for specific asset classes, at haircuts, or at concentration, over your preferred time horizon.
The San Francisco Fed’s John Williams gave an interesting speech awhile back on the challenge of teaching economics after the financial crisis, since the Federal Reserve had deployed new monetary policy and lending tools that “were not found in any textbook.”
In August 2007, at the onset of the recent financial crisis, the Federal Reserve encouraged banks to borrow from the discount window (DW) but few did so. This lack of DW borrowing has been widely attributed to stigma—concerns that, if discount borrowing were detected, depositors, creditors, and analysts could interpret it as a sign of financial weakness. In this post, we review the history of the DW up until 2003, when the current DW regime was established, and argue that some past policies may have inadvertently contributed to a reluctance to borrow from the DW that persists to this day.
In February, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s trading desk announced it will publish a new overnight bank funding rate early next year. The new rate will be based on both federal funds and Eurodollar transactions reported in a new data collection—the FR 2420 Report of Selected Money Market Rates. In a previous post, we explained how FR 2420 fed funds transaction data will replace brokered data as the base for the fed funds effective rate. This post provides insights on the Eurodollar market in advance of the publication of the overnight bank funding rate.
On April 1, 2014, the Federal Reserve began collecting transaction-level data on federal funds, Eurodollars, and certificates of deposits from a large set of domestic banks and agencies of foreign banks operating in the United States. Previously, the Fed had only received fed funds and Eurodollar data from major brokers, and not directly from the banks borrowing in these markets. These new data, collected on form FR 2420, have helped the Fed better understand activity in the fed funds and Eurodollar markets. In this post, we focus on the new data on fed funds, in light of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Trading Desk announcement that it plans to use these data to calculate and publish the fed funds effective rate. We plan to publish other posts on the fed funds and Eurodollar markets over the next several months.
Richard Crump, Emanuel Moench, William O'Boyle, Matthew Raskin, Carlo Rosa, and Lisa Stowe
First in a two-part series
Market expectations of the path of future policy rates can have important implications for financial markets and the economy. Because interest rate derivatives enable market participants to hedge against or speculate on potential changes in various short-term U.S. interest rates, they are a rich and timely source of information on market expectations. In this post, we describe how information about market expectations can be derived from interest rate futures and forwards, focusing on three main instruments: federal funds futures, overnight index swaps (OIS), and Eurodollar futures. We also discuss how options on interest rate futures can be used to gain insight into the full distribution of rate expectations—information that cannot be gleaned from futures or forwards alone. In a forthcoming companion post, we explore an alternative source of policy rate expectations based on the two surveys conducted by the Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Moreno Bertoldi, Philip R. Lane, Paolo Pesenti, and Valérie Rouxel-Laxton
The reason why the macroeconomic policy mix has been different on the two sides of the Atlantic in recent years remains a hotly debated issue. Was it due to a different reading of the root causes of the global financial crisis and therefore of the type of policy response considered most appropriate? Or was it instead the result of incomplete economic and financial integration in the euro area and the absence of a solid backstop for sovereign and banking sector problems, factors that led the euro area—as put by European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi—to resort to “policy choices made under the pressure of events and that were commendable by themselves, but that were sequenced in the wrong order”? Or was it a combination of the two? Looking forward, will the policy mix continue to be different? Are the United States and the euro area at risk of secular stagnation? What are the most effective fiscal consolidation plans for advanced economies with a high government debt/GDP ratio? What are the risks related to evolving liquidity conditions? And is there room for cooperation on the two sides of the Atlantic on macroprudential issues?
From time to time, and most recently in the April 2014 meeting of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee, U.S. Treasury officials have questioned whether the Treasury should have a safety net that would allow it to continue to meet its obligations even in the event of an unforeseen depletion of its cash balances. (Cash balances can be depleted by an unanticipated shortfall in revenues or a spike in disbursements, an inability to access credit markets on a timely basis, or an auction failure.) The original version of the Federal Reserve Act provided a robust safety net because the act implicitly allowed Reserve Banks to buy securities directly from the Treasury. This post reviews the history of the Fed’s direct purchase authority. (A more extensive version of the post appears in this New York Fed staff report.)
Liberty Street Economics features insight and analysis from New York Fed economists working at the intersection of research and policy. Launched in 2011, the blog takes its name from the Bank’s headquarters at 33 Liberty Street in Manhattan’s Financial District.
The editors are Michael Fleming, Andrew Haughwout, Thomas Klitgaard, and Asani Sarkar, all economists in the Bank’s Research Group.
The views expressed are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the New York Fed or the Federal Reserve System.
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