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41 posts on "Regulation"

April 13, 2016

How Does Supervision Affect Banks?



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Supervisors monitor banks to assess the banks’ compliance with rules and regulations but also to ensure that they engage in safe and sound practices (see our earlier post What Do Banking Supervisors Do?). Much of the work that bank supervisors do is behind the scenes and therefore difficult for outsiders to measure. In particular, it is difficult to know what impact, if any, supervisors have on the behavior of banks. In this post, we describe a new Staff Report in which we attempt to measure the impact that supervision has on bank performance. Does more attention by supervisors lead to lower risk at banks and, if so, at what cost to profitability or growth?

Continue reading "How Does Supervision Affect Banks?" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Financial Institutions, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (0)

April 12, 2016

The Economics of Bank Supervision: So Much to Do, So Little Time



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While bank regulation and supervision are the two main components of banking policy, the difference between them is often overlooked and the details of supervision can appear shrouded in secrecy. In this post, which is based on a recent staff report, we provide a framework for thinking about supervision and its relation to regulation. We then use data on supervisory efforts of Federal Reserve bank examiners to describe how supervisory efforts vary by bank size and risk, and to measure key trade-offs in allocating resources.

Continue reading "The Economics of Bank Supervision: So Much to Do, So Little Time" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (0)

April 11, 2016

Supervising Large, Complex Financial Institutions: Defining Objectives and Measuring Effectiveness



Supervising Large, Complex Financial Institutions: Defining Objectives and Measuring Effectiveness

Last month the New York Fed held a conference on supervising large, complex financial institutions. The event featured presentations of empirical and theoretical research by economists here, commentary by academic researchers, and panel discussions with policymakers and senior supervisors. The conference was motivated by the recognition that supervision is distinct from regulation, but that the difference between them is often not well understood. The discussion focused on defining objectives for supervising the large, complex financial companies that figure so prominently in our financial system and ways of measuring how effectively supervision achieves these goals. This post summarizes the key themes from the conference and introduces the more in-depth posts that will follow in this blog series.

Continue reading "Supervising Large, Complex Financial Institutions: Defining Objectives and Measuring Effectiveness" »

Posted by Blog Author at 10:07 AM in Banks, Financial Institutions, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (0)

April 06, 2016

Bank Regulation and Bank Complexity



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U.S. Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) currently control about 3,000 subsidiaries that provide community housing services—such as building low-income housing units, maintaining shelters, and providing housing services to the elderly and disabled. This aspect of U.S. BHC activity is intriguing because it departs from the traditional deposit-taking and loan-making operations typically associated with banks. But perhaps most importantly, the sheer number of these subsidiaries makes one think about the organizational complexity of U.S. BHCs. This is an issue that has generated much discussion in recent years. In this post we describe the emergence and growth of community housing subsidiaries and discuss to what extent they contribute to the complexity of their parent organizations.

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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Financial Institutions, Housing, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (0)

March 07, 2016

Banking Deserts, Branch Closings, and Soft Information



Editors’ Note: The original version of this post slightly overestimated the fraction of people of all types (low income, minority, etc.) who live in banking deserts. This version reports the correct figures. None of the substantive conclusions were affected. (Updated July 12, 2016)

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U.S. banks have shuttered nearly 5,000 branches since the financial crisis, raising concerns that more low-income and minority neighborhoods may be devolving into “banking deserts” with inadequate, or no, mainstream financial services. We investigate this issue and also ask whether such neighborhoods are particularly exposed to branch closings—a development that, according to recent research, could reduce credit access, even with other branches present, by destroying “soft” information about borrowers that influences lenders’ credit decisions. Our findings are mixed, suggesting that further study of these concerns is warranted.

Continue reading "Banking Deserts, Branch Closings, and Soft Information " »

November 30, 2015

U.S. Banks’ Changing Footprint at Home and Abroad



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Some banks are quite simple, while others are part of complex multi-layered organizations with affiliates in many industries scattered all around the world. The latter organizations are formally called bank holding companies (BHCs). In this post, we investigate changes in BHC geography, especially the rising share of BHC affiliates in tax havens and financial secrecy jurisdictions. We examine what has happened since 2000, including the period after the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, which focused attention on the size and complexity of large BHCs. Our analysis complements a growing body of work on large and complex BHCs and their global affiliates, including this blog series based on papers from the Economic Policy Review.


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October 07, 2015

Changes in the Returns to Market Making



Fourth in a six-part series

Since the financial crisis, major U.S. banking institutions have increased their capital ratios in response to tighter capital requirements. Some market analysts have asserted that the higher capital and liquidity requirements are driving up the costs of market making and reducing market liquidity. If regulations were, in fact, increasing the cost of market making, one would expect to see a rise in the expected returns to that activity. In this post, we estimate market-making returns in equity and corporate bond markets to assess the impact of regulations.


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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions, Financial Markets, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (4)

October 05, 2015

Introduction to a Series on Market Liquidity: Part 2



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Market participants and policymakers have raised concerns about the potential adverse effects of financial regulation on market liquidity—the ability to buy and sell securities quickly, at any time, at minimal cost. Market liquidity supports the efficient allocation of capital through financial markets, which is a catalyst for sustainable economic growth. Changes in market liquidity, whether due to regulation or other forces, are therefore of great interest to policymakers and market participants alike.

Continue reading "Introduction to a Series on Market Liquidity: Part 2" »

Posted by Blog Author at 11:00 AM in Dealers, Financial Markets, Liquidity, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (0)

August 17, 2015

Introduction to a Series on Market Liquidity



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Market participants and policymakers have recently raised concerns about market liquidity—the ability to buy and sell securities quickly, at any time, at minimal cost. Market liquidity supports the efficient allocation of capital through financial markets, which is a catalyst for sustainable economic growth. Changes in market liquidity, whether due to regulation, changes in market structure, or otherwise, are therefore of great interest to policymakers and market participants alike.

Continue reading "Introduction to a Series on Market Liquidity" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Dealers, Financial Markets, Liquidity, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (0)

July 20, 2015

Just Released: The U.S. Treasury Market on October 15, 2014



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The $12.7 trillion U.S. Treasury market plays a critical role in the global economy, serving as the primary means of financing the U.S. government, a risk-free benchmark for other financial instruments, and a key venue for the Federal Reserve’s implementation of monetary policy. On October 15, 2014, the market experienced unusually high volatility, record trading volume, and a rapid “round-trip” in prices without a clear cause. In a recently released report, staff of the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the New York Fed, the SEC, and the CFTC examine the events of that day. This preliminary report provides the most thorough analysis to date of the events that day and serves as a foundation for future analysis of Treasury market functioning and structure.

Continue reading "Just Released: The U.S. Treasury Market on October 15, 2014" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Markets, Regulation, Treasury | Permalink | Comments (4)
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