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<oembed><version>1.0</version><provider_name>Liberty Street Economics</provider_name><provider_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org</provider_url><author_name>blog author</author_name><author_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/author/blog-author/</author_url><title>Did Third Avenue&#x2019;s Liquidation Reduce Corporate Bond Market Liquidity? - Liberty Street Economics</title><type>rich</type><width>600</width><height>338</height><html>&lt;blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="wglrPD79wC"&gt;&lt;a href="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/02/did-third-avenues-liquidation-reduce-corporate-bond-market-liquidity/"&gt;Did Third Avenue&#x2019;s Liquidation Reduce Corporate Bond Market Liquidity?&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted" src="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/02/did-third-avenues-liquidation-reduce-corporate-bond-market-liquidity/embed/#?secret=wglrPD79wC" width="600" height="338" title="&#x201C;Did Third Avenue&#x2019;s Liquidation Reduce Corporate Bond Market Liquidity?&#x201D; &#x2014; Liberty Street Economics" data-secret="wglrPD79wC" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no" class="wp-embedded-content"&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;&lt;script&gt;
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</html><thumbnail_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/02/6a01348793456c970c01b7c816d95c970b-500wi.jpg</thumbnail_url><thumbnail_width>460</thumbnail_width><thumbnail_height>288</thumbnail_height><description>Tobias Adrian, Michael J. Fleming, Erik Vogt, and Zachary Wojtowicz The announced liquidation of Third Avenue&#x2019;s high-yield Focused Credit Fund (FCF) on December 9, 2015, drew widespread attention and reportedly sent ripples through asset markets. Events of this kind have the potential to increase the demand for market liquidity, as investors revise expectations, reassess risk [&hellip;]</description></oembed>
