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<oembed><version>1.0</version><provider_name>Liberty Street Economics</provider_name><provider_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org</provider_url><author_name>blog author</author_name><author_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/author/blog-author/</author_url><title>Crisis Chronicles: Gold, Deflation, and the Panic of 1893 - Liberty Street Economics</title><type>rich</type><width>600</width><height>338</height><html>&lt;blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="NIxRnH6J3w"&gt;&lt;a href="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/05/crisis-chronicles-gold-deflation-and-the-panic-of-1893/"&gt;Crisis Chronicles: Gold, Deflation, and the Panic of 1893&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted" src="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/05/crisis-chronicles-gold-deflation-and-the-panic-of-1893/embed/#?secret=NIxRnH6J3w" width="600" height="338" title="&#x201C;Crisis Chronicles: Gold, Deflation, and the Panic of 1893&#x201D; &#x2014; Liberty Street Economics" data-secret="NIxRnH6J3w" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no" class="wp-embedded-content"&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;&lt;script&gt;
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</html><description>In the late 1800s, a surge in silver production made a shift toward a monetary standard based on gold and silver rather than gold alone increasingly attractive to debtors seeking relief from rising real debt burdens through higher prices. The U.S. government made a tentative step in this direction with the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, an 1890 law requiring the Treasury to significantly increase its purchases of silver. Concern about the United States abandoning the gold standard, however, drove up the demand for gold, which drained the Treasury&#x2019;s holdings and created strains on the financial system&#x2019;s liquidity. News in April 1893 that the government was running low on gold was followed by the Panic in May and a severe depression involving widespread commercial and bank failures.</description><thumbnail_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/05/6a01348793456c970c01b7c8599e26970b-450wi.jpg</thumbnail_url></oembed>
