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<oembed><version>1.0</version><provider_name>Liberty Street Economics</provider_name><provider_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org</provider_url><author_name>blog author</author_name><author_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/author/blog-author/</author_url><title>Did the Supervisory Guidance on Leveraged Lending Work? - Liberty Street Economics</title><type>rich</type><width>600</width><height>338</height><html>&lt;blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="CKqZZL0zT3"&gt;&lt;a href="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/05/did-the-supervisory-guidance-on-leveraged-lending-work/"&gt;Did the Supervisory Guidance on Leveraged Lending Work?&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted" src="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/05/did-the-supervisory-guidance-on-leveraged-lending-work/embed/#?secret=CKqZZL0zT3" width="600" height="338" title="&#x201C;Did the Supervisory Guidance on Leveraged Lending Work?&#x201D; &#x2014; Liberty Street Economics" data-secret="CKqZZL0zT3" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no" class="wp-embedded-content"&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;&lt;script&gt;
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</html><thumbnail_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/05/6a01348793456c970c01b8d1e4931e970c-500wi.jpg</thumbnail_url><thumbnail_width>500</thumbnail_width><thumbnail_height>313</thumbnail_height><description>Financial regulatory agencies issued guidance intended to curtail leveraged lending&mdash;loans to firms perceived to be risky&mdash;in March of 2013. In issuing the guidance, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation highlighted several facts that were reminiscent of the mortgage market in the years preceding the financial crisis: rapid growth in the volume of leveraged lending, increased participation by unregulated investors, and deteriorating underwriting standards. Our post shows that banks, in particular the largest institutions, cut leveraged lending while nonbanks increased such lending after the guidance. During the same period of time, nonbanks increased their borrowing from banks, possibly to finance their growing leveraged lending activity.</description></oembed>
