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<oembed><version>1.0</version><provider_name>Liberty Street Economics</provider_name><provider_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org</provider_url><author_name>blog author</author_name><author_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/author/blog-author/</author_url><title>Did the Dodd-Frank Act End &#x2018;Too Big to Fail&#x2019;? - Liberty Street Economics</title><type>rich</type><width>600</width><height>338</height><html>&lt;blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="n19VESID6h"&gt;&lt;a href="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2018/03/did-the-dodd-frank-act-end-too-big-to-fail/"&gt;Did the Dodd&#x2011;Frank Act End &#x2018;Too Big to Fail&#x2019;?&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted" src="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2018/03/did-the-dodd-frank-act-end-too-big-to-fail/embed/#?secret=n19VESID6h" width="600" height="338" title="&#x201C;Did the Dodd&#x2011;Frank Act End &#x2018;Too Big to Fail&#x2019;?&#x201D; &#x2014; Liberty Street Economics" data-secret="n19VESID6h" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no" class="wp-embedded-content"&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;&lt;script&gt;
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</html><thumbnail_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/03/6a01348793456c970c01b8d2df36c6970c-500wi.jpg</thumbnail_url><thumbnail_width>500</thumbnail_width><thumbnail_height>313</thumbnail_height><description>One goal of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was to end &#x201C;too big to fail.&#x201D; Toward that goal, the Act required systemically important financial institutions to submit detailed plans for an orderly resolution (&#x201C;living wills&#x201D;) and authorized the FDIC to create an alternative resolution procedure. In response, the FDIC has developed a &#x201C;single point of entry&#x201D; (SPOE) strategy, under which healthy parent companies bear the losses of their failing subsidiaries. Since SPOE makes the parent company responsible for subsidiaries&#x2019; losses, we would expect parents to become riskier, relative to their subsidiaries, compared to before the announcement of the SPOE strategy in December 2013. Do bond raters and investors share this view?</description></oembed>
