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<oembed><version>1.0</version><provider_name>Liberty Street Economics</provider_name><provider_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org</provider_url><author_name>blog author</author_name><author_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/author/blog-author/</author_url><title>"Skin in the Game," Depositor Discipline, and Bank Risk Taking - Liberty Street Economics</title><type>rich</type><width>600</width><height>338</height><html>&lt;blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="Sq6p6Pl7OG"&gt;&lt;a href="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2018/11/skin-in-the-game-depositor-discipline-and-bank-risk-taking/"&gt;&#x201C;Skin in the Game,&#x201D; Depositor Discipline, and Bank Risk Taking&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted" src="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2018/11/skin-in-the-game-depositor-discipline-and-bank-risk-taking/embed/#?secret=Sq6p6Pl7OG" width="600" height="338" title="&#x201C;&#x201C;Skin in the Game,&#x201D; Depositor Discipline, and Bank Risk Taking&#x201D; &#x2014; Liberty Street Economics" data-secret="Sq6p6Pl7OG" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no" class="wp-embedded-content"&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;&lt;script&gt;
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</html><thumbnail_url>https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/11/6a01348793456c970c022ad37ab03c200c-500wi.jpg</thumbnail_url><thumbnail_width>500</thumbnail_width><thumbnail_height>313</thumbnail_height><description>In a previous post, we argued that double liability for bank owners might not limit their risk taking, despite the extra &#x201C;skin in the game,&#x201D; if it also weakens depositor discipline of banks. This post, drawing on our recent working paper, looks at the interplay of those opposing forces in the late 1920s when bank liability differed across states. We find that double liability may have reduced the outflow of deposits during the crisis, but wasn&#x2019;t successful in mitigating bank risk during the boom.</description></oembed>
