Is the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Working?
While the name of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act suggests two goals, BAPCPA seemed to be more about abuse prevention than consumer protection. The abuse alleged by proponents of BAPCPA, particularly credit card lenders, was that filers were using Chapter 7 bankruptcy to avoid paying credit card debt they could afford to pay. BAPCPA aimed to curb the alleged abuse through a variety of obstacles, most notably a means test intended to divert better off filers from Chapter 7, where credit card and other unsecured debts are discharged (forgiven), to Chapter 13, where unsecured debts may be rescheduled. In this post, I investigate whether BAPCPA is working, where by “working” I mean reducing the overall bankruptcy rate, and reducing that ratio of Chapter 7-to-Chapter 13 filings. Some observers have argued that the reform failed on both counts, but my analysis suggests that conclusion may be only half right.
What BAPCPA Changed
BAPCPA increased the cost of filing for bankruptcy and reduced the benefit, which is protection from creditors. With a slight abuse of language, one could say it reduced the “supply” of bankruptcy protection along a number of dimensions. First, it raised filing fees; the GAO estimated that BAPCPA increased the average cost of filing Chapter 7 from $712 to $1,078, a 51 percent increase. This post on VoxEU.org argues that raising filing costs may lower welfare for liquidity constrained filers who might need bankruptcy protection the most. Beyond higher filing fees, BAPCPA imposed stricter documentation requirements, limited access to home equity exemptions (which determine how much of their home equity filers get to protect from creditors), limited cramdown of auto loans (so owners of underwater autos are less able to have the underwater part discharged), and most importantly, required a means test. Under the means test, filers whose average monthly income (adjusted for family size) over the previous six months exceeds the median income for their state are not eligible for Chapter 7 and discharge of their unsecured debt; if they file at all, they must file under Chapter 13 where they may have to reschedule their unsecured debt.
Did BAPCPA Reduce the Bankruptcy Rate?
To investigate that question, I start by simply plotting the bankruptcy rate per 1,000 households. The chart below reveals three things. First, there was a notable upward trend in the bankruptcy rate before BAPCPA. Indeed, it was partly this upward trend in filings that motivated the reform. Second, it shows the much noted rush to file between April 2005, when BAPCPA was signed into law, and October 2005, when it took effect.
The filing rate dropped dramatically after the rush to file but subsequently resumed an upward trend for a few years. Last, the chart shows that even with the return-to-trend growth, filings did not reach pre-BAPCPA levels until 2010, and even then didn’t quite reach pre-BAPCPA levels.
To determine if BAPCPA reduced the bankruptcy rate relative to the rate one would predict absent BAPCPA, I estimated a regression model relating the bankruptcy rate to four variables: real disposable income per capita, the unemployment rate, the debt service burden (payments on mortgage and consumer debt per disposable income), and a trend. I also included quarterly indicator variables to capture any seasonal patterns in filings. I estimated the model using data from 1994:Q1 to 2005:Q1, so the estimation period ended just before BAPCPA was signed and the rush to file began. Importantly, I am assuming that the upward trend in filings before 2005:Q1 was not driven by anticipation of BAPCPA’s passage.
The main results (I don’t report the quarterly effects) below indicate that filings are significantly, negatively related to income, a sensible result. There is—or was—a significant upward trend in filings. In fact, the trend is as statistically significant as any other variable in the model. This paper from the St. Louis Fed also finds that upward trend in bankruptcy filings matters more than cyclical factors. Curiously, filings are not significantly related to the debt service burden and, even more curiously, they are negatively related to the unemployment rate. It’s not unusual for analysts to find that filings and unemployment are unrelated (see link above), but a negative relationship is puzzling. Despite that puzzle, the overall fit of the model is good; the R2 is 82 percent, meaning the model explains 82 percent of the variation in the filing rate.
Below I plot the actual filing rate, the rate predicted by the model, and two standard error bands. The forecast and standard error bands end in 2011:Q3, the last quarter the debt service ratio is available. The fit of the model pre-BAPCPA is pretty good, primarily because the model captures the upward trend that is the defining movement in the series.
More to the point, actual filings are below the two standard error confidence band, implying BAPCPA (or something else that happened in the post-BAPCPA period) significantly reduced the bankruptcy rate relative to the rate one would predict given cyclical factors and the trend in filings. The forecast error is substantial. The actual filing rate in 2011:Q2 was three per 1,000 households, while the predicted rate was 8.2 per 1,000 households, a forecast error of
Did BAPCPA Divert Filers from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13?
Answering that question doesn’t require any econometrics. It’s obvious from the chart below the ratio of Chapter 7 filings to Chapter 13 filings, apart from the gyration around the passage of BAPCPA, has reverted back to its pre-BAPCPA level of about 2.4.
A Better Measure of Success
In my view, a better measure of success of a bankruptcy reform is whether the reform lowered the cost and/or increased the availability of unsecured credit. The idea, admittedly textbook, is that lower losses to unsecured lenders under bankruptcy, combined with competition among lenders, should increase the supply of unsecured credit. In a study written shortly after BAPCPA took effect, two colleagues and I found no evidence that credit card interest spreads or excess spreads on credit card securitizations had fallen in response. This paper (by Simkovic) didn’t find any evidence of lower rates either. This classic paper by Larry Ausubel explains why, because of a particular form of adverse selection, excess profits in the credit card market might not lead to lower credit card interest rates. Ausubel argues that credit card lenders that might be tempted to cut rates to steal business from competitors are loathe to do so because they may only attract rate-sensitive borrowers who expect to carry large balances. But if those borrowers are riskier (by virtue of their large balances), cutting rates may attract a riskier pool of borrowers. That adverse selection may make credit card interest rates “sticky downward” even in the face of falling charge-offs. I plan to revisit the issue of how BAPCPA affected credit card charge-offs and interest rates in a future post.
The views expressed in this post are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author.