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Liberty Street Economics
61 posts on "Regulation"February 03, 2020
Have the Risk Profiles of Large U.S. Bank Holding Companies Changed?
After the global financial crisis, regulatory changes were implemented to support financial stability, with some changes directly addressing capital and liquidity in bank holding companies (BHCs) and others targeting BHC size and complexity. Although the overall size of the largest U.S. BHCs has not decreased since the crisis, the organizational complexity of these same organizations has declined, with less notable changes being observed in their range of businesses and geographic scope (Goldberg and Meehl, forthcoming). In this post, we explore how different types of BHC risks—risks that can influence the probability that a BHC is stressed, as well as the chance of systemic implications—have changed over time. The results are mixed: Levels of most BHC risks tend to be higher than in the years immediately preceding the crisis, but are markedly lower than the levels seen during and immediately following the crisis.
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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Dodd-Frank, Financial Institutions, Financial Intermediation, Regulation, Systemic Risk | Permalink | Comments (0)July 19, 2019
At the New York Fed: Research Conference on FinTech
Financial technology (“FinTech”) refers to the evolving intersection of financial services and technology. In March, the New York Fed hosted "The First New York Fed Research Conference on FinTech” to understand the implications of FinTech developments on issues that are relevant to the Fed’s mandates such as lending, payments, and regulation. In this post, we summarize the principal themes and findings of the conference.
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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions, Financial Intermediation, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (0)July 17, 2019
How Do Large Banks Manage Their Cash?
Second of two posts
As the aggregate supply of reserves shrinks and large banks implement liquidity regulations, they may follow a variety of liquidity management strategies depending on their business models and the interest rate differences between alternative liquid instruments. For example, the banks may continue to hold large amounts of excess reserves or shift to Treasury or agency securities or shrink their balance sheets. In this post, we provide new evidence on how large banks have managed their cash, which is the largest component of reserves, on a daily basis since the implementation of liquidity regulations.
Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Federal Reserve, Liquidity, Regulation, Repo, Treasury | Permalink | Comments (2)July 15, 2019
Large Bank Cash Balances and Liquidity Regulations
Update (9 a.m.): An earlier version of this post transposed line labels in the first figure. The error has been corrected.
First of two posts
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has recently communicated its aim to continue implementing monetary policy in a regime that maintains an ample supply of reserves, though with a significantly lower level of reserves than has prevailed in recent years. The liquidity needs of the largest U.S. commercial banks play an important role in understanding the banking system’s appetite for actual reserve holdings, which we refer to as bank reserve demand. In this post, we discuss the recent evolution of large bank cash balances and the effect of liquidity regulations on these balances. In part two of this series, we provide new evidence on how the largest banks manage their liquidity needs on a daily basis.
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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Federal Reserve, Fire Sale, Liquidity, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (1)October 17, 2018
Credit Market Choice
Credit default swaps (CDS) are frequently credited with being the cause of AIG’s collapse during the financial crisis. A Reuters article from September 2008, for example, notes “[w]hen you hear that the collapse of AIG […] might lead to a systemic collapse of the global financial system, the feared culprit is, largely, that once-obscure […] instrument known as a credit default swap.” Yet, despite the prominent role that CDS played during the financial crisis, little is known about how individual financial institutions utilize CDS contracts on individual companies. In a recent New York Fed staff report, we assess the choice banks face when trading the idiosyncratic credit risk of a firm, and argue that banks’ participation decisions have been affected in the post-regulation period, either by direct changes in market structure or by changes in the relative cost of pursuing different strategies.
Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions, Financial Intermediation, Financial Markets, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (2)October 16, 2018
Liquidity Effects of Post-Crisis Regulatory Reform
The post-crisis regulatory reform efforts to improve capital and liquidity positions of regulated institutions provide incentives for banks to change not only the structure of their own balance sheets but also how they interact with their customers and other market participants more generally. A 2015 PwC study on global financial market liquidity, for example, noted that “[a]s banks respond to the new regulatory environment, they have sought to make more efficient use of capital and liquidity resources, by reducing the markets they serve and streamlining their operations.” In this blog post, we provide an overview of three recent New York Fed staff reports that study the impact that post-crisis regulation has had on the willingness and ability of regulated firms to participate in U.S. over-the-counter (OTC) markets.
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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis, Dodd-Frank, Financial Institutions, Financial Intermediation, Financial Markets, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (0)October 15, 2018
Did Banks Subject to LCR Reduce Liquidity Creation?
Banks traditionally provide loans that are funded mostly by deposits and thereby create liquidity, which benefits the economy. However, since the loans are typically long-term and illiquid, whereas the deposits are short-term and liquid, this creation of liquidity entails risk for the bank because of the possibility that depositors may “run” (that is, withdraw their deposits on short notice). To mitigate this risk, regulators implemented the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) following the financial crisis of 2007-08, mandating banks to hold a buffer of liquid assets. A side effect of the regulation, however, is a reduction in liquidity creation by banks subject to LCR, as we find in our recent paper.
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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Federal Reserve, Financial Institutions, Financial Intermediation, Liquidity, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (1)October 11, 2018
What Happens When Regulatory Capital Is Marked to Market?
Minimum equity capital requirements are a key part of bank regulation. But there is little agreement about the right way to measure regulatory capital. One of the key debates is the extent to which capital ratios should be based on current market values rather than historical “accrual” values of assets and liabilities. In a new research paper, we investigate the effects of a recent regulatory change that ties regulatory capital directly to the market value of the securities portfolio for some banks.
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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Bank Capital, Banks, Financial Intermediation, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (0)October 09, 2018
Analyzing the Effects of CFPB Oversight
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), created in 2011, is a key element of post-crisis U.S. financial regulation, as well as the subject of intense debate. While some have praised the agency, citing the benefits of consumer financial protection, others argue that its activities involve high compliance costs, increase uncertainty and legal risk, and ultimately reduce the availability of financial services for consumers. We present new evidence on whether the CFPB’s supervisory and enforcement activities have significantly affected the supply of mortgage credit, or had other effects on bank risk-taking and profitability.
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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Credit, Dodd-Frank, Financial Intermediation, Mortgages, Regulation | Permalink | Comments (1)October 02, 2018
Resolving “Too Big to Fail”
Many market participants believe that large financial institutions enjoy an implicit guarantee that the government will step in to rescue them from potential failure. These “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) issues became particularly salient during the 2008 crisis. From the government’s perspective, rescuing these financial institutions can be important to avoid harm to the financial system. The bailouts also artificially lower the risk borne by investors and the financing costs of big banks. The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to remove the incentive for governments to bail out banks in the first place by mandating that each large bank file a “living will” that details its strategy for a rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material distress or failure without disrupting the broader economy. In our recent New York Fed staff report, we look at whether living wills are effective at reducing the cost of implicit TBTF bailout subsidies.
Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis, Dodd-Frank, Financial Institutions, Financial Intermediation, Regulation, Systemic Risk | Permalink | Comments (0)About the BlogLiberty Street Economics features insight and analysis from New York Fed economists working at the intersection of research and policy. Launched in 2011, the blog takes its name from the Bank’s headquarters at 33 Liberty Street in Manhattan’s Financial District.
The editors are Michael Fleming, Andrew Haughwout, Thomas Klitgaard, and Asani Sarkar, all economists in the Bank’s Research Group.
Liberty Street Economics does not publish new posts during the blackout periods surrounding Federal Open Market Committee meetings.
The views expressed are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the New York Fed or the Federal Reserve System.
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