At the New York Fed, our mission is to make the U.S. economy stronger and the financial system more stable for all segments of society. We do this by executing monetary policy, providing financial services, supervising banks and conducting research and providing expertise on issues that impact the nation and communities we serve.
In the first two posts of this three-part series, we discussed private market participants that are active in repo markets for profit-making motives. Central banks are also active repo market participants, but their reasons often differ from those of private participants. In today’s post, we discuss how central banks use repos to manage liquidity in the financial system and implement monetary policy.
The repo market in the U.S. is a mosaic of segments with distinct participants and various settlement and clearing practices. Why do large cash lenders typically settle their trades through a third-party agent? Why does the interdealer market clear through a central counterparty? Why do levered investors favor bilateral trades? In the second post of this series, we follow the cash as it navigates through repo markets to better understand the costs and benefits that shape the existing market structures.
Repo markets play a vital role in the U.S. financial system. In this three-part series, we examine who participates in these markets, what trade-offs influence how different repo segments are structured, and why repos matter for monetary policy. Today’s post introduces repo transactions, focusing on the major private-sector participants and why they engage in these markets.
In past work, we showed that trading in U.S. Treasury securities is becoming increasingly concentrated on the last trading day of each month. In this post, we show that trading is also becoming more concentrated around the designated pricing, or “strike,” times for fixed-income indexes. The concentration is especially pronounced on month-end trading days. We also document a marked shift in trading activity from around 3 p.m. (ET) to around 4 p.m. after a major fixed-income index provider moved its strike time from 3 p.m. to 4 p.m. in January 2021.
This post presents an update of the economic forecasts generated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We describe very briefly our forecast and its change since June 2026. The New York Fed DSGE model expects similar growth, and slightly more persistent inflation, compared to its forecasts in June. r* forecasts are slightly lower for 2026 but higher for the remainder of the forecast horizon.
After two days of heady discussions with academics and policymakers from around the world in high-altitude Jackson Hole, Wyoming, I’m now decompressing back at Street Level. The main theme of this year’s Kansas City Fed symposium was financial innovation in the payments space—a fast-evolving topic with major implications for consumers and central bankers alike. In this post, I’ll share some general takeaways from those Jackson Hole talks and highlight related New York Fed research on payments and financial intermediation.
The dollar’s share of global official foreign exchange reserves fell from 64 percent in 2015 to 56 percent in 2025. This downward trajectory is sometimes read as evidence that the dollar’s role in international financial markets is eroding. However, aggregate statistics obscure the composition of changes occurring at the country level. In this post, we show that the aggregate decline is not a systematic global shift away from dollar assets. Rather, the aggregate decline reflects the actions of a handful of large reserve holders, changing either their currency preferences or the size of their reserve portfolio. From the perspective of the cross section of countries holding dollar assets, the dollar’s status in official portfolios is largely intact.
The ongoing advancement and adoption of artificial intelligence continues to raise concerns about widespread job losses. Over the past three years, our regional business surveys have asked firms about their AI adoption and its effects on their workforces. This year, we found that AI use among regional businesses has continued to rise sharply, with more than 60 percent of service firms and about half of manufacturers now using AI—a notable increase from 40 percent and 26 percent, respectively, reported in 2025. Despite this rapid adoption, regional firms’ investments in AI are generally modest, usage tends to be concentrated among a small share of workers within firms, and layoffs have remained uncommon. And, while some firms have scaled back hiring due to AI, others have added workers to help them use it. Retraining employees in response to AI remains the primary way firms are adjusting their workforces.
Stock market participation in the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past four decades. In the mid-1980s, fewer than 30 percent of households held equity. By the early 2000s, more than half of U.S. households owned equity, either directly or through mutual funds, 401(k)s, and IRAs. As participation widened, the way stock market fluctuations passed through to household spending may have changed, with potential implications for how the broader economy behaves. An argument can be made that the rise in equity market participation has dampened the response of output to interest rate changes as stock market fluctuations are now spread across a larger share of households, moderating movements in consumer spending, asset prices, and investment spending.
A long-standing body of research, inspired by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), has documented the effects of Fed interest rate surprises on stock markets. While stock markets provide valuable information about the investor risk premium and dividend growth expectations, researchers have only recently developed more comprehensive tools to estimate the term structure of equity risk premia and dividend growth expectations across a broad range of maturities. In this post, we investigate the impact of monetary policy surprises (or shocks) on short- and long-term estimates of risk premia and growth expectations through the lens of the Giglio, Kelly, and Kozak (2024) model.
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