158 posts on "Banks"
May 12, 2025
Who Finances Real Sector Lenders?
The modern financial system is complex, with funding flowing not just from the financial sector to the real sector but within the financial sector through an intricate network of financial claims. While much of our work focuses on understanding the end result of these flows—credit provided to the real sector—we explore in this post how accounting for interlinkages across the financial sector changes our perception of who finances credit to the real sector.
March 31, 2025
Why Are Credit Card Rates So High?
Credit cards play a crucial role in U.S. consumer finance, with 74 percent of adults having at least one. They serve as the main method of payment for most individuals, accounting for 70 percent of retail spending. They are also the primary source of unsecured borrowing, with 60 percent of accounts carrying a balance from one month to the next. Surprisingly, credit card interest rates are very high, averaging 23 percent annually in 2023. Indeed, their rates are far higher than the rates on any other major type of loan or bond. Why are credit card rates so high? In our recent research paper, we address this question using granular account-level data on 330 million monthly credit card accounts.
January 8, 2025
Do Payout Restrictions Reduce Bank Risk?
In June 2020, the Federal Reserve issued stringent payout restrictions for the largest banks in the United States as part of its policy response to the COVID-19 crisis. Similar curbs on share buybacks and dividend payments were adopted in other jurisdictions, including in the eurozone, the U.K., and Canada. Payout restrictions were aimed at enhancing banks’ resiliency amid heightened economic uncertainty and concerns about the risk of large losses. But besides being a tool to build capital buffers and preserve bank equity, payout restrictions may also prevent risk-shifting. This post, which is based on our recent research paper, attempts to answer whether and how payout restrictions reduce bank risk using the U.S. experience during the pandemic as a case study.
December 20, 2024
Anatomy of the Bank Runs in March 2023
Runs have plagued the banking system for centuries and returned to prominence with the bank failures in early 2023. In a traditional run—such as depicted in classic photos from the Great Depression—depositors line up in front of a bank to withdraw their cash. This is not how modern bank runs occur: today, depositors move money from a risky to a safe bank through electronic payment systems. In a recently published staff report, we use data on wholesale and retail payments to understand the bank run of March 2023. Which banks were run on? How were they different from other banks? And how did they respond to the run?
Posted at 6:30 am in Banks, Crisis, Financial Institutions, Lender of Last Resort, Panic | Permalink | Comments (1)
December 3, 2024
Documenting Lender Specialization
Robust banks are a cornerstone of a healthy financial system. To ensure their stability, it is desirable for banks to hold a diverse portfolio of loans originating from various borrowers and sectors so that idiosyncratic shocks to any one borrower or fluctuations in a particular sector would be unlikely to cause the entire bank to go under. With this long-held wisdom in mind, how diversified are banks in reality?
November 25, 2024
Why Do Banks Fail? Bank Runs Versus Solvency
Evidence from a 160-year-long panel of U.S. banks suggests that the ultimate cause of bank failures and banking crises is almost always a deterioration of bank fundamentals that leads to insolvency. As described in our previous post, bank failures—including those that involve bank runs—are typically preceded by a slow deterioration of bank fundamentals and are hence remarkably predictable. In this final post of our three-part series, we relate the findings discussed previously to theories of bank failures, and we discuss the policy implications of our findings.
November 22, 2024
Why Do Banks Fail? The Predictability of Bank Failures
Can bank failures be predicted before they happen? In a previous post, we established three facts about failing banks that indicated that failing banks experience deteriorating fundamentals many years ahead of their failure and across a broad range of institutional settings. In this post, we document that bank failures are remarkably predictable based on simple accounting metrics from publicly available financial statements that measure a bank’s insolvency risk and funding vulnerabilities.
November 21, 2024
Why Do Banks Fail? Three Facts About Failing Banks
Why do banks fail? In a new working paper, we study more than 5,000 bank failures in the U.S. from 1865 to the present to understand whether failures are primarily caused by bank runs or by deteriorating solvency. In this first of three posts, we document that failing banks are characterized by rising asset losses, deteriorating solvency, and an increasing reliance on expensive noncore funding. Further, we find that problems in failing banks are often the consequence of rapid asset growth in the preceding decade.
September 25, 2024
Flood Risk Outside Flood Zones — A Look at Mortgage Lending in Risky Areas
In support of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) creates flood maps that indicate areas with high flood risk, where mortgage applicants must buy flood insurance. The effects of flood insurance mandates were discussed in detail in a prior blog series. In 2021 alone, more than $200 billion worth of mortgages were originated in areas covered by a flood map. However, these maps are discrete, whereas the underlying flood risk may be continuous, and they are sometimes outdated. As a result, official flood maps may not fully capture the true flood risk an area faces. In this post, we make use of unique property-level mortgage data and find that in 2021, mortgages worth over $600 billion were originated in areas with high flood risk but no flood map. We examine what types of lenders are aware of this “unmapped” flood risk and how they adjust their lending practices. We find that—on average—lenders are more reluctant to lend in these unmapped yet risky regions. Those that do, such as nonbanks, are more aggressive at securitizing and selling off risky loans.
August 12, 2024
Reallocating Liquidity to Resolve a Crisis
Shortly after the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in March 2023, a consortium of eleven large U.S. financial institutions deposited $30 billion into First Republic Bank to bolster its liquidity and assuage panic among uninsured depositors. In the end, however, First Republic Bank did not survive, raising the question of whether a reallocation of liquidity among financial institutions can ever reduce the need for central bank balance sheet expansion in the fight against bank runs. We explore this question in this post, based on a recent working paper.
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