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108 posts on "Crisis"
November 22, 2024

Why Do Banks Fail? The Predictability of Bank Failures

Photo of old bank building with columns.

Can bank failures be predicted before they happen? In a previous post, we established three facts about failing banks that indicated that failing banks experience deteriorating fundamentals many years ahead of their failure and across a broad range of institutional settings. In this post, we document that bank failures are remarkably predictable based on simple accounting metrics from publicly available financial statements that measure a bank’s insolvency risk and funding vulnerabilities.

August 12, 2024

Reallocating Liquidity to Resolve a Crisis

Decorative photo of silver spigot on blackboard with dollar signs chalked on the board coming out of the spigot.

Shortly after the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in March 2023, a consortium of eleven large U.S. financial institutions deposited $30 billion into First Republic Bank to bolster its liquidity and assuage panic among uninsured depositors. In the end, however, First Republic Bank did not survive, raising the question of whether a reallocation of liquidity among financial institutions can ever reduce the need for central bank balance sheet expansion in the fight against bank runs. We explore this question in this post, based on a recent working paper.

Posted at 7:00 am in Banks, Crisis, Liquidity | Permalink
August 7, 2024

The Anatomy of Labor Demand Pre‑ and Post‑COVID

Decorative photo: Nurse taking a women's blood pressure at home.

Has labor demand changed since the COVID-19 pandemic? In this post, we leverage detailed data on the universe of U.S. online job listings to study the dynamics of labor demand pre- and post-COVID. We find that there has been a significant shift in listings out of the central cities and into the “fringe” portion of large metro areas, smaller metro areas, and rural areas. We also find a substantial decline in job listings in computer and mathematical and business and financial operations occupations, and a corresponding increase in job openings in sales, office and administrative support, food preparation, and especially healthcare occupations. These patterns (by geography and by occupation) are interconnected: the biggest declines in job listings by occupation occurred in the largest and densest geographies, and the strongest increases in job listings by occupation occurred in the smaller and less populated geographies.

Posted at 7:00 am in Crisis, Employment, Labor Market, Pandemic | Permalink
May 31, 2023

Do Economic Crises in Europe Affect the U.S.? Some Lessons from the Past Three Decades

decorative photo: flags of U.S. and Euro

In this post we summarize the main results of our contribution to a recent e-book, “The Making of the European Monetary Union: 30 years since the ERM crisis,” on the economic and financial crises in Europe since 1992-93, and focus on the spillovers of those crises onto the United States and the global economy. We find that the answer to the question in the title of this post is a (moderate) yes.

May 24, 2023

Measuring the Financial Stability Real Interest Rate, r**

Decorative photo: gold image of coins with bar and line chart super imposed.

Comparing our financial stability real interest rate, r** (“r-double-star”) with the prevailing real interest rate gives a measure of how vulnerable the economy is to financial instability. In this post, we first explain how r** can be measured, and then discuss its evolution over the last fifty years and how to interpret the recent banking turmoil within this framework.

May 12, 2023

Banks Runs and Information

Decorative photo: outside doors of Signature Bank building with bank name over the doors.

The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Signature Bank (SB) has raised questions about the fragility of the banking system. One striking aspect of these bank failures is how the runs that preceded them reflect risks and trade-offs that bankers and regulators have grappled with for many years. In this post, we highlight how these banks, with their concentrated and uninsured deposit bases, look quite similar to the small rural banks of the 1930s, before the creation of deposit insurance. We argue that, as with those small banks in the early 1930s, managing the information around SVB and SB’s balance sheets is of first-order importance.

Posted at 7:00 am in Banks, Crisis, Financial Institutions | Permalink
April 17, 2023

Financial Fragility without Banks

Painting of the old town hall in Amsterdam with the Bank of Amsterdam to the right by Pieter Saenredam.

Proponents of narrow banking have argued that lender of last resort policies by central banks, along with deposit insurance and other government interventions in the money markets, are the primary causes of financial instability. However, as we show in this post, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) triggered a financial crisis in 1772 even though the financial system at that time had few banks and deposits were not insured. NBFIs profited from funding risky, longer-dated assets using cheap short-term wholesale funding and, when they eventually failed, authorities felt compelled to rescue the financial system.

April 14, 2023

Mitigating the Risk of Runs on Uninsured Deposits: the Minimum Balance at Risk

Decorative image: SANTA CLARA, CALIFORNIA - MARCH 13: Members of the media line up outside of a Silicon Valley Bank office on March 13, 2023 in Santa Clara, California. Days after Silicon Valley Bank collapsed, customers are lining up to try and retrieve their funds from the failed bank. The Silicon Valley Bank failure is the second largest in U.S. history. (Photo by Justin Sullivan/Getty Images)

The incentives that drive bank runs have been well understood since the seminal work of Nobel laureates Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig (1983). When a bank is suspected to be insolvent, early withdrawers can get the full value of their deposits. If and when the bank runs out of funds, however, the bank cannot pay remaining depositors. As a result, all depositors have an incentive to run. The failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank remind us that these incentives are still present for uninsured depositors, that is, those whose bank deposits are larger than deposit insurance limits. In this post, we discuss a policy proposal to reduce uninsured depositors’ incentives to run.

July 12, 2022

The Global Dash for Cash in March 2020

photo: rows of coins for finance and banking concept with Forex graph, Coins stack for business concept

The economic disruptions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic sparked a global dash-for-cash as investors sold securities rapidly. This selling pressure occurred across advanced sovereign bond markets and caused a deterioration in market functioning, leading to a number of central bank actions. In this post, we highlight results from a recent paper in which we show that these disruptions occurred disproportionately in the U.S. Treasury market and offer explanations for why investors’ selling pressures were more pronounced and broad-based in this market than in other sovereign bond markets.

June 27, 2022

The First Global Credit Crisis

Photo: Amsterdam stock exchange in 17 and 18 centuries; source Wikimedia

June 2022 marks the 250th anniversary of the outbreak of the 1772-3 credit crisis. Although not widely known today, this was arguably the first “modern” global financial crisis in terms of the role that private-sector credit and financial products played in it, in the paths of financial contagion that propagated the initial shock, and in the way authorities intervened to stabilize markets. In this post, we describe these developments and note the parallels with modern financial crises.

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