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40 posts on "Crisis"

September 23, 2019

Once Upon a Time in the Banking Sector: Historical Insights into Banking Competition



Once Upon a Time in the Banking Sector: Historical Insights into Banking Competition


How does competition among banks affect credit growth and real economic growth? In addition, how does it affect financial stability? In this blog post, we derive insights into this important set of questions from novel data on the U.S. banking system during the nineteenth century.

Continue reading "Once Upon a Time in the Banking Sector: Historical Insights into Banking Competition" »

June 26, 2019

How Large Are Default Spillovers in the U.S. Financial System?



Second of two posts
How Large Are Default Spillovers in the U.S. Financial System?

When a financial firm suffers sufficiently high losses, it might default on its counterparties, who may in turn become unable to pay their own creditors, and so on. This “domino” or “cascade” effect can quickly propagate through the financial system, creating undesirable spillovers and unnecessary defaults. In this post, we use the framework that we discussed in “Assessing Contagion Risk in a Financial Network,” the first part of this two-part series, to answer the question: How vulnerable is the U.S. financial system to default spillovers?

Continue reading "How Large Are Default Spillovers in the U.S. Financial System?" »

June 24, 2019

Assessing Contagion Risk in a Financial Network



First of two posts
Assessing Contagion Risk in a Financial Network


In compiling a list of key takeaways of the 2008 financial crisis, surely the dangers of counterparty risk would be near the top. During the crisis, speculation on which financial institution would be next to default on its obligations to creditors, and which one would come after that, dominated news cycles. Since then, there has been an explosion in research trying to understand and quantify the default spillovers that can arise through counterparty risk. This is the first of two posts delving into the analysis of financial network contagion through this spillover channel. Here we introduce a framework that is useful for thinking about default cascades, originally developed by Eisenberg and Noe.

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February 25, 2019

What Can We Learn from the Timing of Interbank Payments?



LSE_What Can We Learn from the Timing of Interbank Payments?

From 2008 to 2014 the Federal Reserve vastly increased the size of its balance sheet, mainly through its large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAPs). The resulting abundance of reserves affected the financial system in a number of ways, including by changing the intraday timing of interbank payments. In this post we show that (1) there appears to be a nonlinear relationship between the amount of reserves in the system and the timing of interbank payments, and (2) with the increase in reserves, smaller banks shifted their timing of payments more significantly than larger banks did. This result suggests that tracking the timing of payments sent by banks could provide an informative signal about the impact of the shrinking Federal Reserve balance sheet on the payments system.

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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Crisis, Liquidity | Permalink | Comments (1)

January 18, 2019

Post-Crisis Financial Regulation: Experiences from Both Sides of the Atlantic



LSE_Post-Crisis Financial Regulation: Experiences from Both Sides of the Atlantic

To mark the 100-year anniversary of the Banca d’Italia’s New York office, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Banca d’Italia hosted a workshop on post-crisis financial regulation in November 2018. The goal of the workshop was to discuss differences in regulation between the United States and Europe (and around the globe more broadly), examine gaps in current regulations, identify challenges to be addressed, and raise awareness about the unintended consequences of regulation. The workshop included presentations by researchers from the U.S. and Europe on such topics as market liquidity, funding, and capital requirements. In this post, we present some of the findings and discussions from the workshop.

Continue reading "Post-Crisis Financial Regulation: Experiences from Both Sides of the Atlantic" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Central Bank, Crisis, Financial Intermediation | Permalink | Comments (0)

January 17, 2019

The Indirect Costs of Lehman’s Bankruptcy



Fifth of five posts
LSE_The Indirect Costs of Lehman’s Bankruptcy

In our previous post, we assessed losses to customers and clients from foregone opportunities after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008. In this post, we examine losses to Lehman and its investors in anticipation of bankruptcy. For example, if bankruptcy is expected, Lehman’s earnings may decline as customers close their accounts or certain securities (such as derivatives) to which Lehman is a counterparty may lose value. We estimate these losses by analyzing Lehman’s earnings and stock, bond, and credit default swap (CDS) prices.

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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Crisis, Stocks | Permalink | Comments (0)

January 16, 2019

Customer and Employee Losses in Lehman’s Bankruptcy



Fourth of five posts
LSE_2019_lehman4-clients_sarkar_460

In our second post on the Lehman bankruptcy, we discussed the cost to Lehman’s creditors from having their funds tied up in bankruptcy proceedings. In this post, we focus on losses to Lehman’s customers and employees from the destruction of firm-specific assets that could not be deployed as productively with other firms. Our conclusions are based in part on what happened after bankruptcy—whether, for example, customer accounts moved to other firms or employees found jobs elsewhere. While these costs are difficult to pin down, the analysis suggests that the most notable losses were borne by mutual funds that relied on Lehman’s specialized brokerage advice and firms that employed Lehman for its equity underwriting services.

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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Crisis, Dealers, Employment, Financial Intermediation | Permalink | Comments (0)

January 15, 2019

Lehman’s Bankruptcy Expenses



Third of five posts
LSE_Lehman’s Bankruptcy Expenses

In bankruptcy, firms incur expenses for services provided by lawyers, accountants, and other professionals. Such expenses can be quite high, especially for complex resolutions. These direct costs of bankruptcy proceedings reduce a firm’s value below its fundamental level, thus constituting a “deadweight loss.” Bankruptcy also carries indirect costs, such as the loss in value of assets trapped in bankruptcy—a subject discussed in our previous post. In this post, we provide the first comprehensive estimates of the direct costs of resolving Lehman Brothers’ holding company (LBHI) and its affiliates under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and of Lehman’s broker-dealer (LBI) under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA).

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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis, Dealers, Financial Intermediation | Permalink | Comments (0)

January 14, 2019

Creditor Recovery in Lehman’s Bankruptcy



Second of five posts
LSE_Creditor Recovery in Lehman’s Bankruptcy

Expectations of creditor recovery were low when the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy process started. On the day the firm filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, the average price of Lehman’s senior bonds implied a recovery rate of about 30 percent for senior creditors. A month later the bond price was implying a recovery rate of 9 percent, consistent with results from Lehman’s CDS auction. Two and a half years later, Lehman’s estate estimated that the recovery rate for holding company creditors would be just 16 percent. So, ten years after the filing, how much did creditors actually recover?

Continue reading "Creditor Recovery in Lehman’s Bankruptcy" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:02 AM in Banks, Crisis, Fire Sale, Liquidity | Permalink | Comments (0)

How Much Value Was Destroyed by the Lehman Bankruptcy?



First of five posts
LSE_How Much Value Was Destroyed by the Lehman Bankruptcy?

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 15, 2008, initiating one of the largest and most complex bankruptcy proceedings in history. Recovery prospects for creditors, who submitted about $1.2 trillion of claims against the Lehman estate, were quite bleak. This week, we will publish a series of four posts that provide an assessment of the value lost to Lehman, its creditors, and other stakeholders now that the bankruptcy proceedings are winding down. Where appropriate, we also consider the liquidation of Lehman’s investment banking affiliate, which occurred in separate proceedings under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA).

Continue reading "How Much Value Was Destroyed by the Lehman Bankruptcy?" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Crisis, Dealers, Financial Intermediation | Permalink | Comments (2)
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Liberty Street Economics features insight and analysis from New York Fed economists working at the intersection of research and policy. Launched in 2011, the blog takes its name from the Bank’s headquarters at 33 Liberty Street in Manhattan’s Financial District.

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