Can Workers Predict Job Finding and Job Loss?
Richard Audoly, Ivy Chen, Miles Guerin, and Rachel Schuh
Workers’ perceptions of the labor market may differ from aggregate labor market statistics. Individuals might be overly optimistic about their chance of finding a job, or too pessimistic about the odds of losing their current position. In this post, we compare subjective beliefs of future job-finding and job-loss from the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE) with their realized counterparts in the Current Population Survey (CPS). We then investigate how closely aggregate perceptions of job-finding and job-loss prospects align with realized rates.
Evaluating New LinkedIn Labor Market Tightness Indicators
Elizabeth B. Li, Giorgio Topa, and Jacob P. Weber
Measures of labor market tightness (LMT) describe how difficult it is for firms to find workers. The labor market is considered tight if there are few job seekers available relative to job openings, implying stronger wage pressures as employers compete for scarce job seekers. Thus, good measures of LMT are important for predicting wage inflation and calibrating monetary policy. Recently, the hiring platform LinkedIn began producing three innovative LMT measures based on its user data. In this post, we use public data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to evaluate the ability of these novel measures to predict wage and price inflation relative to existing LMT measures, finding that one stands out as particularly useful and timely.
AI Adoption and Employment Expectations: Evidence from a Survey of Small Business Owners
Will Aarons and Asani Sarkar
There is little consensus on the effect of AI adoption on employment. Economy-wide measures of pay and headcount have moved little even as AI adoption has spread rapidly, yet narrower measures document declining hiring for workers at the start of their careers or in AI-exposed occupations. In this post, we revisit this topic for U.S. small businesses. We use data from the 2025 Small Business Credit Survey (SBCS) to examine the twelve-month-forward employment and revenue expectations of AI users. We find that firms currently using AI are significantly more likely than non-users to expect increased employment and revenues over the next year, even after accounting for firm and owner characteristics and location. Revenue expectations are most optimistic for AI users that report facing operational challenges in utilizing technology.
The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share
Richard Audoly, Miles Guerin, Srinidhi Narayanan, and Rachel Schuh
The labor share of income in the U.S. is currently at its lowest-ever level in the post-war period. The labor share measures the fraction of economic output paid to workers as wages and salaries. As such, it is a useful benchmark for wage growth: when the labor share falls, it means that productivity, prices, or both are growing faster than wages. After much-studied drops in the 2000s, the labor share fell sharply again after the COVID pandemic. In this post, we compare the dynamics of the labor share post-COVID to earlier periods to understand whether the recent decline represents the continuation of a trend or a new and distinct phenomenon. We find that both the cyclicality of the labor share and the contribution of reallocation to the labor share post-COVID are similar to earlier periods.
Remote Work Leaves Younger Workers Sidelined
Natalia Emanuel, Emma Harrington, and Amanda Pallais
Youth unemployment has risen dramatically since the pandemic—as has the prevalence of remote work. Our analysis suggests that these trends are related, with remote work making it more difficult for managers to train and mentor new employees. Accordingly, companies may be reluctant to hire less-experienced workers in distributed work arrangements. We estimate that remote work can explain 64 percent of the recent increase in unemployment among young college graduates. Further, the timing of this surge suggests that remote work—not generative AI—explains the bulk of the rise in youth unemployment.
Assessing the Current State of Wage Inflation
Martin Almuzara, Richard Audoly, and Davide Melcangi
Economists often look at nominal wage growth to gauge labor market imbalances, price pressures, and households’ spending ability. But to use wage growth for these purposes, it is important to look through short-run fluctuations and retrieve underlying wage inflation. In this post, we use our own measure of wage growth persistence—called Trend Wage Inflation (TWIn in short)—to summarize what we learned from wage growth behavior in the past years and draw conclusions for what may lie ahead. Since peaking in late 2021, TWIn has been on a steady decline, reaching levels near those of the 2017-19 period. In the past few months, however, this decline seems to have lost momentum. Our analysis shows that most of the decline in TWIn between 2022 and 2025 was common across industries. Recently, however, a few sectors have shown a decoupling of wage growth dynamics.
Do Job Postings Show Early Labor‑Market Effects of AI?
Richard Audoly, Miles Guerin, and Giorgio Topa
As generative AI tools become more widely used, a key issue is the technology’s impact on labor demand. Where might we find evidence of that impact? In this post, we examine whether early evidence of AI’s effect on the labor market appears in firms’ job postings. We combine an occupational measure of AI exposure with detailed U.S. job-posting data from Lightcast, which aggregates listings from company career pages, national and local job boards, and job-listing aggregators. Using this data, we test whether postings for AI-exposed occupations declined disproportionately since the release of ChatGPT in late 2022. We find that, while overall hiring has slowed since then, the evidence from job postings provides little indication of a distinct AI-driven decline in labor demand.
Use of Gen AI in the Workplace and the Value of Access to Training
Ali Hashim, Gizem Kosar, and Wilbert van der Klaauw
The rapid spread of generative AI (AI) tools is reshaping the workplace at a remarkable rate. Yet relatively little is known about whether workers have access to these tools, how the tools affect workers’ daily productivity, and how much workers value the training needed to use the tools effectively. In this post, we shed light on these issues by drawing on supplemental questions in the November 2025 Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE), fielded to a representative sample of the U.S. population. We find that adoption of AI tools at work is heterogeneous, that a sizable share of workers see AI training as important, and that a significant share of employers are nonetheless not yet providing access to AI tools or training on how to use them.
Are Rising Employee Health Insurance Costs Dampening Wage Growth?
Jaison R. Abel, Richard Deitz, and Nick Montalbano
Employer-sponsored health insurance represents a substantial component of total compensation paid by firms to many workers in the United States. Such costs have climbed by close to 20 percent over the past five years. Indeed, the average annual premium for employer-sponsored family health insurance coverage was about $27,000 in 2025—roughly equivalent to the wage of a full-time worker paid $15 per hour. Our February regional business surveys asked firms whether their wage setting decisions were influenced by the rising cost of employee health insurance. As we showed in our companion post, respondents reported an average increase in such costs of more than 13 percent this year. Businesses providing insurance to their workers indicated that absent these cost increases, they would have raised wages by roughly an additional percentage point, on average, suggesting that rising health insurance costs resulted in a drag on wage growth for workers at these firms.
What Workplace Composition Are Job Candidates Looking For?
Rachel Schuh
Why do workers still segregate by sex across occupations, industries, and firms? Recent research has focused on how preferences for job amenities, like flexibility, may differ by sex. However, one “amenity” that has received relatively little attention is the sex composition of a job itself. In a recent paper, I conducted a survey experiment to estimate men’s and women’s preferences for sex composition in the workplace. One result is that women and young single men prefer jobs with at least half female coworkers.
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