Honey, Who Shrunk the U.S. Income Surplus?
Matthew Higgins and Thomas Klitgaard
Foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets are immense, with official estimates putting their current market value at $69 trillion. U.S. holdings of foreign assets are also impressive but much smaller, at $41 trillion. The shortfall in U.S. foreign assets relative to foreign liabilities has been mounting for decades. Yet U.S. investment income receipts—in profits, dividends, and interest—comfortably exceeded income payments until recently. We show that the fading of the net investment income surplus stems from the upward shift in interest rates in the aftermath of the pandemic along with the continued net sales of U.S. assets to foreign investors.
Will Mounting Supply Chain Strains Hamstring the AI Investment Boom?
Hunter L. Clark, Jeffrey B. Dawson, and Shad Turney
The conflict in the Middle East has precipitated a global supply shock—the third in six years following the pandemic in 2020 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The current shock raises the specter of spillovers to the U.S. through both prices and physical shortages of goods. A critical conduit for spillovers through these channels is via Asian supply chains, especially from middle- to lower-middle income countries in southeast Asia, which are key suppliers for goods needed for the AI infrastructure build-out in the U.S. These countries are also heavily reliant on Middle East energy imports. This post examines key factors related to these Asian supply chain vulnerabilities.
In What Ways Has U.S. Trade with China Changed?
Hunter L. Clark and Gregory Simitian
Over the past year, U.S. trade policy with China has undergone enormous changes, but with surprisingly little effect on overall trade balances. In fact, the U.S.’s twelve-month trade deficit, while highly volatile due to import front-running early in the year, ended 2025 at $1.2 trillion, almost unchanged from 2024. At the same time, China’s trade surplus with the world actually increased from $1 trillion to $1.2 trillion. However, when looking at changes between individual countries, one sees large shifts in bilateral balances. In this post, we will focus on changing trade flows between the U.S., China, and southeast Asia.
A Closer Look at Emerging Market Resilience During Recent Shocks
Hunter L. Clark, Jeffrey B. Dawson, and Julian Gonzalez-Murphy
A succession of shocks to the global economy in recent years has focused attention on the improved economic and financial resilience of emerging market economies. For some of these economies, this assessment is well-founded and highlights the fruits of deep, structural economic reforms since the 1990s. However, for a much larger universe of countries, the ability to weather shocks is still mixed and many remain vulnerable. In this post, we explore the divide between the two sets of countries and focus on the effects of recent economic shocks, including the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.
China’s Electric Trade
Thomas Klitgaard
China has spent considerable government resources to develop advanced electric technology industries, such as those that produce electric vehicles, lithium batteries, and solar panels. These efforts have spilled over to international trade as improvements in price and quality have increased the global demand for these goods. One consequence is that passenger cars and batteries have been disproportionately large contributors to the rise in the country’s trade surplus in recent years. This has not been the case, though, for solar panels, as falling prices due to a supply glut pulled down export revenues despite higher volumes.
Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs?
Mary Amiti, Chris Flanagan, Sebastian Heise, and David E. Weinstein
Over the course of 2025, the average tariff rate on U.S. imports increased from 2.6 to 13 percent. In this blog post, we ask how much of the tariffs were paid by the U.S., using import data through November 2025. We find that nearly 90 percent of the tariffs’ economic burden fell on U.S. firms and consumers.
Tariffs, Trade, and Tumbling Credit Scores: The Top 5 LSE Posts of 2025
Maureen Egan
Each year brings a new set of economic challenges: In 2025, major areas of focus included tariffs and trade tensions, as well as the financial pressures facing younger adults. New York Fed economists contributed insightful research on both topics—and readers took notice. In fact, all five of the year’s most-read posts on Liberty Street Economics analyzed aspects of these issues. Read on to see how the restoration of student loan data to credit reports affected borrowers’ credit scores, whether the costs of a college degree are still worth it, how businesses are responding to higher tariffs, and why the U.S. runs a trade deficit.
Dutch Treat: The Netherlands’ Exorbitant Privilege in the Eighteenth Century
Stein Berre and Asani Sarkar
The term “exorbitant privilege” emerged in the 1960s to describe the advantages derived by the U.S. economy from the dollar’s status as the de facto global reserve currency. In this post, we examine the exorbitant privilege that accrued to the Netherlands in the eighteenth century, when the Dutch guilder enjoyed global reserve currency status. We show how the private actions of financial institutions created and maintained this privilege, even in the absence of a central bank. While privilege benefited the Dutch financial system in many ways, it also laid the seeds of later financial crisis.
A Country‑Specific View of Tariffs
Matthew Higgins and Thomas Klitgaard
U.S. trade policy remains in flux. Nevertheless, important elements of the new policy regime are apparent in data through July. What stands out are the large differences in realized tariff rates by trading partner, ranging from less than 5 percent for Canada and Mexico to 15 percent for Japan and to 40 percent for China. This post shows that the bulk of cross-country differences in tariff rates is explained by two factors: the U.S.-Canada-Mexico free trade agreement and differing sales shares in tariff-exempt categories.
Financial Intermediaries and Pressures on International Capital Flows
Linda S. Goldberg and Samantha Hirschhorn
Global factors, like monetary policy rates from advanced economies and risk conditions, drive fluctuations in volumes of international capital flows and put pressure on exchange rates. The components of international capital flows that are described as global liquidity—consisting of cross-border bank lending and financing of issuance of international debt securities—have sensitivities to risk conditions that have evolved considerably over time. This risk sensitivity has been driven, in part, by the composition and business models of the financial institutions involved in funding. In this post, we ask whether these same features have led to changes in the pressures on currency values as risk conditions evolve. Using the Goldberg and Krogstrup (2023) Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) country indices, we show that the features of financial institutions in the source countries for international capital do influence how destination countries experience currency pressures when risk conditions change. Better shock-absorbing capacity in financial institutions moderates the pressures toward depreciation of currencies during adverse global risk events.
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