Economic surveys are very popular these days and for a good reason. They tell us how the folks being surveyed—professional forecasters, households, firm managers—feel about the economy. So, for instance, the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE) website displays an inflation uncertainty measure that tells us households are more uncertain about inflation than they were pre-COVID, but a bit less than they were a few months ago. The Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) tells us that forecasters believed last May that there was a lower risk of negative 2024 real GDP growth than there was last February. The question addressed in this post is: Does this information actually have any predictive content? Specifically, I will focus on the SPF and ask: When professional forecasters indicate that their uncertainty about future output or inflation is higher, does that mean that output or inflation is actually becoming more uncertain, in the sense that the SPF will have a harder time predicting these variables?
Are Professional Forecasters Overconfident?
The post-COVID years have not been kind to professional forecasters, whether from the private sector or policy institutions: their forecast errors for both output growth and inflation have increased dramatically relative to pre-COVID (see Figure 1 in this paper). In this two-post series we ask: First, are forecasters aware of their own fallibility? That is, when they provide measures of the uncertainty around their forecasts, are such measures on average in line with the size of the prediction errors they make? Second, can forecasters predict uncertain times? That is, does their own assessment of uncertainty change on par with changes in their forecasting ability? As we will see, the answer to both questions sheds light of whether forecasters are rational. And the answer to both questions is “no” for horizons longer than one year but is perhaps surprisingly “yes” for shorter-run forecasts.
The Disparate Outcomes of Bank‑ and Nonbank‑Financed Private Credit Expansions
Long-run trends in increased access to credit are thought to improve real activity. However, “rapid” credit expansions do not always end well and have been shown in the academic literature to predict adverse real outcomes such as lower GDP growth and an increased likelihood of crises. Given these financial stability considerations associated with rapid credit expansions, being able to distinguish in real time “good booms” from “bad booms” is of crucial interest for policymakers. While the recent literature has focused on understanding how the composition of borrowers helps distinguish good and bad booms, in this post we investigate how the composition of lending during a credit expansion matters for subsequent real outcomes.
An Update on the Reservation Wages in the SCE Labor Market Survey
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s July 2024 SCE Labor Market Survey shows a year-over-year increase in the average reservation wage—the lowest wage respondents would be willing to accept for a new job—to $81,147, but a decline from a series’ high of $81,822 in March 2024. In this post, we investigate how the recent dynamics of reservation wages differed across individuals and how reservation wages are related to individuals’ expectations about their future labor market movements.
A New Set of Indicators of Reserve Ampleness
The Federal Reserve (Fed) implements monetary policy in a regime of ample reserves, where short-term interest rates are controlled mainly through the setting of administered rates, and active management of the reserve supply is not required. In yesterday’s post, we proposed a methodology to evaluate the ampleness of reserves in real time based on the slope of the reserve demand curve—the elasticity of the federal (fed) funds rate to reserve shocks. In this post, we propose a suite of complementary indicators of reserve ampleness that, jointly with our elasticity measure, can help policymakers ensure that reserves remain ample as the Fed shrinks its balance sheet.
When Are Central Bank Reserves Ample?
The Federal Reserve (Fed) implements monetary policy in a regime of ample reserves, whereby short-term interest rates are controlled mainly through the setting of administered rates. To do so, the quantity of reserves in the banking system needs to be large enough that everyday changes in reserves do not cause large variations in the policy rate, the so-called federal funds rate. As the Fed shrinks its balance sheet following the plan laid out by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in 2022, how can it assess when to stop so that the supply of reserves remains ample? In the first post of a two-part series, based on the methodology developed in our recent Staff Report, we propose to assess the ampleness of reserves in real time by estimating the slope of the reserve demand curve.
Reallocating Liquidity to Resolve a Crisis
Shortly after the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in March 2023, a consortium of eleven large U.S. financial institutions deposited $30 billion into First Republic Bank to bolster its liquidity and assuage panic among uninsured depositors. In the end, however, First Republic Bank did not survive, raising the question of whether a reallocation of liquidity among financial institutions can ever reduce the need for central bank balance sheet expansion in the fight against bank runs. We explore this question in this post, based on a recent working paper.
The Anatomy of Labor Demand Pre‑ and Post‑COVID
Has labor demand changed since the COVID-19 pandemic? In this post, we leverage detailed data on the universe of U.S. online job listings to study the dynamics of labor demand pre- and post-COVID. We find that there has been a significant shift in listings out of the central cities and into the “fringe” portion of large metro areas, smaller metro areas, and rural areas. We also find a substantial decline in job listings in computer and mathematical and business and financial operations occupations, and a corresponding increase in job openings in sales, office and administrative support, food preparation, and especially healthcare occupations. These patterns (by geography and by occupation) are interconnected: the biggest declines in job listings by occupation occurred in the largest and densest geographies, and the strongest increases in job listings by occupation occurred in the smaller and less populated geographies.
Mortgage Lock‑In Spurs Recent HELOC Demand
Mortgage balances, the largest component of U.S. household debt, grew by only $77 billion (0.6 percent) in the second quarter of 2024, according to the latest Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit from the New York Fed’s Center for Microeconomic Data. This modest increase reflects a substantial slowdown in mortgage origination; only $374 billion was originated during the second quarter, compared to an average of about $1 trillion per quarter between 2021 and 2022. Meanwhile, after nearly thirteen years of decline, balances on home equity lines of credit (HELOC) have begun to rebound, gaining 20 percent since bottoming out at the end of 2021. In this post, we consider the factors behind this upswing, finding that HELOCs have likely become an attractive alternative to cash-out refinancings amid higher interest rates.
The DeFi Intermediation Chain
Decentralized Finance, or DeFi, is a rapidly growing ecosystem of financial applications built on blockchain technology, primarily on the Ethereum network. These applications aim to recreate traditional financial instruments and services, such as lending, borrowing, trading, and insurance. The DeFi intermediation chain connects a series of intermediaries who find arbitrage opportunities, aggregate transactions into blocks, validate these blocks, and ultimately append them to the blockchain. In this post, we summarize results from our staff report describing how arbitrage opportunities arise in the Ethereum blockchain, and how the need to keep these arbitrage opportunities private gives rise to the intermediation chain.