44 posts on "Systemic Risk"
May 30, 2018
Good News, Leverage, and Sudden Stops
One of the major debates in open economy macroeconomics is the extent to which capital inflows are beneficial for growth. In principle, these flows allow countries to increase their consumption and investment spending beyond their income by enabling them to tap into foreign saving. Periods of such borrowing, however, are associated with large trade deficits, external debt accumulation, and, in some cases, overheating when these economies operate beyond their potential output level for an extended period of time. The relevant question in this context is whether the rate at which a country is taking on external debt has useful predictive information about financial crises.
Posted at 7:00 am in Balance of Payments, International Economics, Macroeconomics, Systemic Risk | Permalink
March 5, 2018
Did the Dodd‑Frank Act End ‘Too Big to Fail’?
One goal of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was to end “too big to fail.” Toward that goal, the Act required systemically important financial institutions to submit detailed plans for an orderly resolution (“living wills”) and authorized the FDIC to create an alternative resolution procedure. In response, the FDIC has developed a “single point of entry” (SPOE) strategy, under which healthy parent companies bear the losses of their failing subsidiaries. Since SPOE makes the parent company responsible for subsidiaries’ losses, we would expect parents to become riskier, relative to their subsidiaries, compared to before the announcement of the SPOE strategy in December 2013. Do bond raters and investors share this view?
February 12, 2018
Does More “Skin in the Game” Mitigate Bank Risk‑Taking?
It is widely said that a lack of “skin in the game” would distort lenders’ incentives and cause a moral hazard problem, that is, excessive risk-taking. If so, does more skin in the game—in the form of extended liability—reduce bankers’ risk-taking? In order to examine this question, we investigate historical data prior to the Great Depression, when bank owners’ liability for losses in the event of bank failure differed by state and primary regulator. This post describes our preliminary findings.
Posted at 7:00 am in Banks, Credit, Economic History, Financial Institutions, Regulation, Systemic Risk | Permalink | Comments (3)
February 2, 2018
New Report Assesses Structural Changes in Global Banking
The Committee on the Global Financial System, made up of senior officials from central banks around the world and chaired by New York Fed President William Dudley, recently released a report on “Structural Changes in Banking after the Crisis.” The report includes findings from a wide-ranging study documenting the significant structural adjustments in banking systems around the world in response to regulatory, technological, and market changes after the crisis, while also assessing their implications for financial stability, credit provision, and capital markets activity. It includes a new banking database spanning over twenty-one countries from 2000 to 2016 that could serve as a valuable reference for further analysis. Overall, the study concludes that the changed regulatory and market environment since the crisis has led banks to alter their business models and balance sheets in ways that make them more resilient but also less profitable, while continuing their role as intermediaries providing financial services to the real economy.
Posted at 7:00 am in Banks, Credit, Financial Institutions, Financial Intermediation, Regulation, Systemic Risk | Permalink | Comments (1)
May 12, 2017
At the N.Y. Fed: The Evolution of OTC Derivatives Markets
The 2007-09 financial crisis illustrated the fragility of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets and the contagion generated through bilateral derivatives exposures.
April 10, 2017
Financial Crises and the Desirability of Macroprudential Policy
The global financial crisis has put financial stability risks—and the potential role of macroprudential policies in addressing them—at the forefront of policy debates. The challenge for macroeconomists is to develop new models that are consistent with the data while being able to capture the highly nonlinear nature of crisis episodes. In this post, we evaluate the impact of a macroprudential policy that has the government tilt incentives for banks to encourage them to build up their equity positions. The government has a role since individual banks do not internalize the systemic benefit of having more bank equity. Our model allows for an evaluation of the tradeoff between the size of such incentives and the probability of a future financial crisis
February 18, 2016
Are Asset Managers Vulnerable to Fire Sales?
According to conventional wisdom, an open-ended investment fund that has a floating net asset value (NAV) and no leverage will never experience a run and hence never have to fire-sell assets.
June 29, 2015
August 4, 2014
Financial Stability Monitoring
In a recently released New York Fed staff report, we present a forward-looking monitoring program to identify and track time-varying sources of systemic risk.
Posted at 10:00 am in Fed Funds, Financial Institutions, Financial Markets, Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy, Systemic Risk | Permalink
April 17, 2014
Liquidity Policies and Systemic Risk
One of the most innovative and potentially far-reaching consequences of regulatory reform since the financial crisis has been the development of liquidity regulations for the banking system.
Posted at 7:00 am in Financial Institutions, Financial Markets, Liquidity, Regulation, Systemic Risk | Permalink
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