The Central Banking Beauty Contest
Expectations can play a significant role in driving economic outcomes, with central banks factoring market sentiment into policy decisions and market participants forming their own assumptions about monetary policy. But how well do central banks understand the expectations of market participants—and vice versa? Our model, developed in a recent paper, features a dynamic game between (i) a monetary authority that cannot commit to an inflation target and (ii) a set of market participants that understand the incentives created by that credibility problem. In this post, we describe the game, a type of Keynesian beauty contest: its main novelty is that each side attempts, with varying degrees of accuracy, to forecast the other’s beliefs, resulting in new findings regarding the levels and trajectories of inflation.
Can Discount Window Stigma Be Cured?
One of the core responsibilities of central banks is to act as “lender of last resort” to the financial system. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve has been operating as a lender of last resort through its “discount window” (DW) for more than a century. Historically, however, the DW has been plagued by stigma—banks’ reluctance to use the DW, even for benign reasons, out of concerns that it could be interpreted as a sign of financial weakness. In this post, we report on new research showing that once a DW facility is stigmatized, removing that stigma is difficult.