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9 posts on "Crisis Chronicles "

April 21, 2014

Introduction to the Floating-Rate Note Treasury Security

Ezechiel Copic, Luis Gonzalez, Caitlin Gorback, Blake Gwinn, and Ernst Schaumburg

Introduction
The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) auctioned its first floating-rate note (FRN) on January 29, 2014. With this auction, Treasury introduced the first new marketable debt instrument since Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) in 1997. The new two-year FRN is a fixed-principal security with quarterly interest payments and interest rates indexed to the thirteen-week Treasury bill. In this post, we will discuss Treasury’s reasons for adopting an FRN as well as the existing FRN markets, expected FRN market participants, and results of the first FRN Treasury security auction.

Continue reading "Introduction to the Floating-Rate Note Treasury Security" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis Chronicles , Financial Institutions | Permalink | Comments (2)

April 11, 2014

Crisis Chronicles: Not Worth a Continental—The Currency Crisis of 1779 and Today’s European Debt Crisis

James Narron and David Skeie

Shortbobintro During the late 1770s, a newly founded United States began to run up significant debts to finance the American Revolution. With limited access to credit and little to no tax base, the Continental Congress issued the Continental to finance the war. But by the end of the decade, inflation was nearly 50 percent, a suit cost a million Continentals, and the phrase “not worth a Continental” had entered the national lexicon. With the help of our fourth U.S. president, James Madison, we review why the Continental experiment ended so badly.

Continue reading "Crisis Chronicles: Not Worth a Continental—The Currency Crisis of 1779 and Today’s European Debt Crisis" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis Chronicles | Permalink | Comments (1)

March 07, 2014

Crisis Chronicles: The Credit and Commercial Crisis of 1772

James Narron and David Skeie

During the decade prior to 1772, Britain made the most of an expansion in colonial lands that required significant capital investment across the East and West Indies and North America. As commodities like tobacco flowed from colonial lands to Britain, merchandise and basic supplies flowed back to the colonies. With capital scarce in the American colonies, colonial planters were eager to borrow cheap capital from British creditors. But because planters often maintained open lines of credit through multiple trade channels, creditors had no way of knowing a particular planter’s indebtedness. So when two banks in London failed, contagion spread and the credit boom suddenly ended. In this edition of Crisis Chronicles, we learn the perils of private indebtedness and offer an inverse comparison of today’s “originate-to-distribute” mortgage market.

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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis Chronicles | Permalink | Comments (0)

February 07, 2014

Crisis Chronicles: The Commercial Credit Crisis of 1763 and Today’s Tri-Party Repo Market

James Narron and David Skeie

During the economic boom and credit expansion that followed the Seven Years’ War (1756-63), Berlin was the equivalent of an emerging market, Amsterdam’s merchant bankers were the primary sources of credit, and the Hamburg banking houses served as intermediaries between the two. But some Amsterdam merchant bankers were leveraged far beyond their capacity. When a speculative grain deal went bad, the banks discovered that there were limits to how much risk could be effectively hedged. In this issue of Crisis Chronicles, we review how “fire sales” drove systemic risk in funding markets some 250 years ago and explain why this could still happen in today’s tri-party repo market.

Continue reading "Crisis Chronicles: The Commercial Credit Crisis of 1763 and Today’s Tri-Party Repo Market" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis Chronicles | Permalink | Comments (5)

January 10, 2014

Crisis Chronicles: The Mississippi Bubble of 1720 and the European Debt Crisis

James Narron and David Skeie

Convicted murderer and millionaire gambler John Law spotted an opportunity to leverage paper money and credit to finance trade. He first proposed the concept in Scotland in 1705, where it was rejected. But by 1716, Law had found a new audience for his ideas in France, where he proposed to the Duke of Orleans his plan to establish a state bank, at his own expense, that would issue paper money redeemable at face value in gold and silver. At the time, Law’s Banque Generale was one of only six such banks to have issued paper money, joining Sweden, England, Holland, Venice, and Genoa. Things didn’t turn out exactly as Law had hoped, and in this edition of Crisis Chronicles we meet the South Sea’s lesser-known cousin, the Mississippi Bubble.

Continue reading "Crisis Chronicles: The Mississippi Bubble of 1720 and the European Debt Crisis" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis Chronicles | Permalink | Comments (5)

November 08, 2013

Crisis Chronicles: The South Sea Bubble of 1720—Repackaging Debt and the Current Reach for Yield

James Narron and David Skeie

In 1720, the South Sea Company offered to pay the British government for the right to buy the national debt from debtholders in exchange for shares backed by dividends to be paid from the company’s debt holdings and South Sea trade profits. The Bank of England countered the proposal and the two then competed for the right to buy the debt, with South Sea ultimately winning through bribes to the government. Later that year, the government moved to divert more capital to South Sea shares by hampering investment opportunities for rival companies in what became known as the Bubble Act, and public confidence was shaken. In this edition of the Crisis Chronicles, we explore the rise and fall of the South Sea Company and offer a cautionary look at the current reach for yield.

Continue reading "Crisis Chronicles: The South Sea Bubble of 1720—Repackaging Debt and the Current Reach for Yield" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis Chronicles | Permalink | Comments (2)

September 30, 2013

Crisis Chronicles: The “Not So Great” Re-Coinage of 1696

James Narron and David Skeie

In the late 1600s, England operated a bi-metallic monetary system of high-value gold coins and lower-value silver coins. In the early 1690s, however, the market price of silver began to rise at a time when the mint price of gold was higher than the market price. Thus, gold bullion was flowing to the mint while silver coins were flowing to the commodity markets. By 1695, nearly half of the silver specie was missing from coin in circulation in England as coins were “clipped” (shaved) with the result that their face value no longer reflected the metal content. Ironically, low-weight coin was still accepted for tax payments. In this post, we recount England’s efforts to remedy the “ill state of the coin of the kingdom” during the re-coinage of 1696.

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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis Chronicles , Economic History, Monetary Policy | Permalink | Comments (0)

September 06, 2013

Crisis Chronicles: Tulip Mania, 1633-37

James Narron and David Skeie

As Mike Dash notes in his well-researched and gripping Tulipomania, tulips are native to central Asia and arrived in the 1570s in what’s now Holland, primarily through the efforts of botanist Charles de L’Escluse, who classified and spread tulip bulbs among horticulturalists in the late 1500s and early 1600s. By the early 1630s, the tulip was a fixture in Dutch gardens. But Tulip Mania didn’t begin until the summer of 1633, when a house in Hoorn was exchanged for three rare tulips and a Frisian farmhouse was traded for a number of tulip bulbs. The lure of profit enticed novice florists to enter the tulip trade with minimal investment and small parcels of land, harkening back to the days of farmers taking up coin clipping during the Kipper und Wipperzeit. In this edition of Crisis Chronicles, we exchange the trading floors of today for the alcohol-fueled exchanges of the past as we dig up Tulip Mania.

 

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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis Chronicles , Economic History, Financial Markets | Permalink | Comments (1)

June 24, 2013

Crisis Chronicles: 300 Years of Financial Crises (1620–1920)

James Narron and David Skeie

As momentous as financial crises have been in the past century, we sometimes forget that major financial crises have occurred for centuries—and often. This new series chronicles mostly forgotten financial crises over the 300 years—from 1620 to 1920—just prior to the Great Depression. Today, we journey back to the 1620s and take a fresh look at an economic crisis caused by the rapid debasement of coin in the states that made up the Holy Roman Empire.


Continue reading "Crisis Chronicles: 300 Years of Financial Crises (1620–1920)" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Crisis Chronicles , Economic History, Monetary Policy | Permalink | Comments (5)
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