73 posts on "inflation"
June 22, 2026
The New York Fed DSGE Model Forecast—June 2026
This post presents an update of the economic forecasts generated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We describe very briefly our forecast and its change since March 2026. To summarize, inflation forecasts are higher in 2026 than predicted in March. Projections for the short-run real natural rate of interest (r*) increased slightly relative to March.
May 26, 2026
Assessing the Current State of Wage Inflation
Economists often look at nominal wage growth to gauge labor market imbalances, price pressures, and households’ spending ability. But to use wage growth for these purposes, it is important to look through short-run fluctuations and retrieve underlying wage inflation. In this post, we use our own measure of wage growth persistence—called Trend Wage Inflation (TWIn in short)—to summarize what we learned from wage growth behavior in the past years and draw conclusions for what may lie ahead. Since peaking in late 2021, TWIn has been on a steady decline, reaching levels near those of the 2017-19 period. In the past few months, however, this decline seems to have lost momentum. Our analysis shows that most of the decline in TWIn between 2022 and 2025 was common across industries. Recently, however, a few sectors have shown a decoupling of wage growth dynamics.
May 20, 2026
AI’s Macroeconomic Challenges and Promises
In the third quarter of 2025, America’s largest tech firms for the first time spent more on capital investment than they earned from operations. The implication is that AI, a technology with the potential to make the economy more productive, is, for now, absorbing resources faster than it is generating returns. This post discusses how the tension between AI’s long-run promise and its short-run costs affects the outlooks for inflation, real activity, and financial stability.
Posted at 7:00 am in Artificial Intelligence (AI), Inflation, Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy | Permalink
May 1, 2026
Explaining the K‑Shaped Economy: What’s Behind the Divide?
In our companion post, we used a new module of our Economic Heterogeneity Indicators (EHIs) to shed light on how recent retail spending growth has been driven by high-income households. This fact is consistent with the popular press’s idea of a “K-shaped economy” in which higher-income households experience faster growth in spending than lower-income households. In this post, we dive deeper into the reasons behind this divergence by analyzing for which goods this trend holds true and ask whether it can be explained by changes in wages, inflation, or wealth. We find that, since 2023, wealth has increased the most for high-income households, while inflation has risen the most for low-income households, with both factors helping explain the fact that real retail spending rose the most for high-income households. In contrast, earnings display a more mixed pattern, though earnings of the highest earners have grown more rapidly than earnings of the lowest earners.
March 4, 2026
Firms’ Inflation Expectations Return to 2024 Levels
Businesses experienced substantial cost pressures in 2025 as the cost of insurance and utilities rose sharply, while an increase in tariffs contributed to rising goods and materials costs. This post examines how firms in the New York-Northern New Jersey region adjusted their prices in response to these cost pressures and describes their expectations for future price increases and inflation. Survey results show an acceleration in firms’ price increases in 2025, with an especially sharp increase in the manufacturing sector. While both cost and price increases intensified last year, our surveys reveal that these do not contribute to firms believing that inflation will be on the rise in the short or longer term. In fact, firms’ inflation expectations have moderated compared to what was expected a year ago. Firms now anticipate inflation of 3 percent in the year ahead, lower than what was expected last year at this time. Importantly, like last year, longer-term inflation expectations also remain well anchored.
February 17, 2026
Seeing Through the Shutdown’s Missing Inflation Data
Data releases for inflation have been scarce over the past four months due to the government shutdown. As a result, until January 22 no personal consumer expenditures (PCE) data were available beyond September and the consumer price index (CPI) had many missing entries for the one-month changes for October and November. In this post, we use an extended version of the New York Fed’s Multivariate Core Trend (MCT) inflation model to examine changes in underlying inflation over this period. The MCT model is well-suited to do so because it decomposes sectoral inflation rates into a trend (“persistent”) and a transitory component. In contrast to core (ex-food and energy) inflation, its aim is to remove all transitory factors, thus identifying the underlying trend. In addition, since the model can handle missing data—like for October—it can produce values for trend inflation for months where little or no data were released. Our findings suggest caution: while the fragmented data from November initially signaled a deceleration in price pressures, the integration of December data indicates that these reductions were largely transitory. Once the full data set is used, the aggregate trend for December stands at 2.83 percent, an increase from 2.55 percent in September.
February 12, 2026
Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs?
Over the course of 2025, the average tariff rate on U.S. imports increased from 2.6 to 13 percent. In this blog post, we ask how much of the tariffs were paid by the U.S., using import data through November 2025. We find that nearly 90 percent of the tariffs’ economic burden fell on U.S. firms and consumers.
February 5, 2026
Does the Phillips Curve Steepen When Costs Surge?
Inflation does not always respond to cost and demand pressures in the same way. When shocks are small, the mapping from costs to prices is roughly proportional—double the shock, double the inflation response. But when the economy is hit by large shocks, this proportionality breaks down. As the recent surge and subsequent decline of global inflation showed, price growth can accelerate—or decelerate—by more than one-for-one relative to the size of the disturbance. Economists refer to this pattern as nonlinear inflation dynamics. In this post, I discuss what these nonlinearities mean, how they relate to the slope of the Phillips curve discussed in a companion post, and how firm-level data can help us understand the mechanisms behind them.
February 4, 2026
Anatomy (not Autopsy) of the Phillips Curve
The relationship between inflation and real economic activity has long been central to debates in macroeconomics and monetary policy. At the core of this debate is the Phillips curve (PC), which measures how strongly inflation reacts to movements in economic conditions. The steepness of this curve matters enormously for monetary policy: if the PC is steeper, inflation rises faster during booms and falls faster in recessions, which entails central banks having to act more forcefully if they want to stabilize inflation around their target. Prior analysis found astonishingly small estimates of the slope of the PC, which suggests that the curve is “flat” (or even dead). In this post, I present evidence from coauthored research showing that, contrary to the conventional view, the Phillips curve is alive and steep, and it captures inflation volatility remarkably well once real marginal cost is used instead of standard real economic activity measures.
January 14, 2026
Understating Rising Quality Means Import Price Inflation Is Overstated
It is common for price measures to consider changes in quality. That is, a price index might fall even though listed prices are unchanged because the quality of the item has improved. An adjustment for quality captures the fact that consumers are effectively getting more for the same dollar when product quality rises. In practice, however, it is notoriously difficult to measure quality changes since it requires access to detailed data on all product characteristics that matter to consumers. We offer a novel method to infer quality changes and apply it to U.S. import price indices. When we account for quality improvements in this way, we find that the import price inflation based on official measures has been overstated, revealing that consumers have been getting more from their purchases of imported goods than what standard quality adjustments suggest.
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