The New York Fed DSGE Model Forecast—March 2025

This post presents an update of the economic forecasts generated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We describe very briefly our forecast and its change since December 2024. As usual, we wish to remind our readers that the DSGE model forecast is not an official New York Fed forecast, but only an input to the Research staff’s overall forecasting process. For more information about the model and variables discussed here, see our DSGE model Q & A.
Firms’ Inflation Expectations Have Picked Up

After a period of particularly high inflation following the pandemic recession, inflationary pressures have been moderating the past few years. Indeed, the inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index has come down from a peak of 9.1 percent in the summer of 2022 to 3 percent at the beginning of 2025. The New York Fed asked regional businesses about their own cost and price increases in February, as well as their expectations for future inflation. Service firms reported that business cost and selling price increases continued to moderate through 2024, while manufacturing firms reported some pickup in cost increases but not price increases. Looking ahead, firms expect both cost and price increases to move higher in 2025. Moreover, year-ahead inflation expectations have risen from 3 percent last year at this time to 3.5 among manufacturing firms and 4 percent among service firms, though longer-term inflation expectations remain anchored at around 3 percent.
Kartik Athreya on His First Year as Research Director of the New York Fed
Supply and Demand Drivers of Global Inflation Trends

Our previous post identified strong global components in the slow-moving and persistent dynamics of headline consumer price index (CPI) inflation in the U.S. and abroad. We labeled these global components as the Global Inflation Trend (GIT), the Core Goods Global Inflation Trend (CG-GIT) and the Food & Energy Global Inflation Trend (FE-GIT). In this post we offer a narrative of the drivers of these global inflation trends in terms of shocks that induce a trade-off for monetary policy, versus those that do not. We show that most of the surge in the persistent component of inflation across countries is accounted for by global supply shocks—that is, shocks that induce a trade-off for central banks between their objectives of output and inflation stabilization. Global demand shocks have become more prevalent since 2022. However, had central banks tried to fully offset the inflationary pressures due to sustained demand, this would have resulted in a much more severe global economic contraction.
Global Trends in U.S. Inflation Dynamics

A key feature of the post-pandemic inflation surge was the strong correlation among inflation rates across sectors in the United States. This phenomenon, however, was not confined to the U.S. economy, as similar inflationary pressures have emerged in other advanced economies. As generalized as the inflation surge was, so was its decline from the mid-2022 peak. This post explores the common features of inflation patterns in the U.S. and abroad using an extension of the Multivariate Core Trend (MCT) Inflation model, our underlying inflation tracker for the U.S. The Global MCT model purges transitory noise from international sectoral inflation data and quantifies the covariation of their persistent components—in the form of global inflation trends—along both country and sectoral dimensions. We find that global trends play a dominant role in determining the slow-moving and persistent dynamics of headline consumer price index (CPI) inflation in the U.S. and abroad, both over the pre-pandemic and post pandemic samples.
Every Dollar Counts: The Top 5 Liberty Street Economics Posts of 2024

High prices and rising debt put pressure on household budgets this year, so it’s little wonder that the most-read Liberty Street Economics posts of 2024 dealt with issues of financial stress: rising delinquency rates on credit cards and auto loans, the surge in grocery prices, and the spread of “buy now, pay later” plans. Another top-five post echoed this theme in an international context: Could the U.S. dollar itself be under stress as central banks seemingly turn to other reserve currencies? Read on for details on the year’s most popular posts.
The New York Fed DSGE Model Forecast—December 2024

This post presents an update of the economic forecasts generated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We describe very briefly our forecast and its change since September 2024. As usual, we wish to remind our readers that the DSGE model forecast is not an official New York Fed forecast, but only an input to the Research staff’s overall forecasting process. For more information about the model and variables discussed here, see our DSGE model Q & A.
Banking System Vulnerability: 2024 Update

After a period of relative stability, a series of bank failures in 2023 renewed questions about the fragility of the banking system. As in previous years, we provide in this post an update of four analytical models aimed at capturing different aspects of the vulnerability of the U.S. banking system using data through 2024:Q2 and discuss how these measures have changed since last year.
A New Indicator of Labor Market Tightness for Predicting Wage Inflation

A key question in economic policy is how labor market tightness affects wage inflation and ultimately prices. In this post, we highlight the importance of two measures of tightness in determining wage growth: the quits rate, and vacancies per searcher (V/S)—where searchers include both employed and non-employed job seekers. Amongst a broad set of indicators, we find that these two measures are independently the most strongly correlated with wage inflation. We construct a new index, called the Heise-Pearce-Weber (HPW) Tightness Index, which is a composite of quits and vacancies per searcher, and show that it performs best of all in explaining U.S. wage growth, including over the COVID pandemic and recovery.
On the Distributional Consequences of Responding Aggressively to Inflation

This post discusses the distributional consequences of an aggressive policy response to inflation using a Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) model. We find that, when facing demand shocks, stabilizing inflation and real activity go hand in hand, with very large benefits for households at the bottom of the wealth distribution. The converse is true however when facing supply shocks: stabilizing inflation makes real outcomes more volatile, especially for poorer households. We conclude that distributional considerations make it much more important for policy to take into account the tradeoffs between stabilizing inflation and economic activity. This is because the optimal policy response depends very strongly on whether these tradeoffs are present (that is, when the economy is facing supply shocks) or absent (when the economy is facing demand shocks).