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43 posts on "Central Bank"May 19, 2020
The Primary Dealer Credit Facility
This post is part of an ongoing series on the credit and liquidity facilities established by the Federal Reserve to support households and businesses during the COVID-19 outbreak.
On March 17, 2020, the Federal Reserve announced that it would re-establish the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) to allow primary dealers to support smooth market functioning and facilitate the availability of credit to businesses and households. The PDCF started offering overnight and term funding with maturities of up to ninety days on March 20. It will be in place for at least six months and may be extended as conditions warrant. In this post, we provide an overview of the PDCF and its usage to date.
Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Bank Capital, Banks, Central Bank, COVID-19 Facilities, Credit, Federal Reserve, Liquidity, Monetary Policy, Pandemic, Systemic Risk | Permalink | Comments (0)May 15, 2020
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility
This post is part of an ongoing series on the credit and liquidity facilities established by the Federal Reserve to support households and businesses during the COVID-19 outbreak.
In mid-March, the Federal Reserve announced a slew of credit and liquidity facilities aimed at supporting credit provision to U.S. households and businesses. Among the initiatives is the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) which aims to support market functioning and provide a liquidity backstop for the commercial paper market. The domestic commercial paper market provides a venue for short-term financing for companies which employ more than 6 million Americans. Securities in the commercial paper market represent a key asset class for money market mutual funds. This post documents the dislocations in the commercial paper market that motivated the creation of this facility, and tracks the subsequent improvement in market conditions.
Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Central Bank, Corporate Finance, COVID-19 Facilities, Federal Reserve, Financial Markets, Liquidity, Pandemic | Permalink | Comments (0)May 08, 2020
The Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
This post is part of an ongoing series on the credit and liquidity facilities established by the Federal Reserve to support households and businesses during the COVID-19 outbreak.
Over the first three weeks of March, as uncertainty surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic increased, prime and municipal (muni) money market funds (MMFs) faced large redemption pressures. Similarly to past episodes of industry dislocation, such as the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 European bank crisis, outflows from prime and muni MMFs were mirrored by large inflows into government MMFs, which have historically been seen by investors as a safe haven in times of crisis. In this post, we describe a liquidity facility established by the Federal Reserve in response to these outflows.
Continue reading "The Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility" »
Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Central Bank, COVID-19 Facilities, Credit, Federal Reserve, Financial Institutions, Financial Intermediation, Financial Markets, Liquidity, Monetary Policy, Pandemic | Permalink | Comments (0)April 17, 2020
Treasury Market Liquidity during the COVID-19 Crisis
A key objective of recent Federal Reserve policy actions is to address the deterioration in financial market functioning. The U.S. Treasury securities market, in particular, has been the subject of Fed and market participants’ concerns, and the venue for some of the Fed’s initiatives. In this post, we evaluate a basic metric of market functioning for Treasury securities— market liquidity—through the first month of the Fed’s extraordinary actions. Our particular focus is on how liquidity in March 2020 compares to that observed over the past fifteen years, a period that includes the 2007-09 financial crisis.
Continue reading "Treasury Market Liquidity during the COVID-19 Crisis" »
Posted by Blog Author at 12:01 PM in Balance of Payments, Banks, Central Bank, Corporate Finance, Financial Markets, Pandemic | Permalink | Comments (1)April 10, 2020
Helping State and Local Governments Stay Liquid
This post is part of an ongoing series on the credit and liquidity facilities established by the Federal Reserve to support households and businesses during the COVID-19 outbreak.
On April 9, the Federal Reserve announced up to $2.3 trillion in new support for the economy in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Among the initiatives is the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF), intended to support state and local governments. The details of the facility are described in the term sheet. The state and local sector is a unique but very important part of the economy. This post lays out some of the economics of the sector and the needs that the facility intends to satisfy.
Continue reading "Helping State and Local Governments Stay Liquid" »
Posted by Blog Author at 4:25 PM in Central Bank, COVID-19 Facilities, Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy, Pandemic | Permalink | Comments (0)February 26, 2020
Did Subprime Borrowers Drive the Housing Boom?
Editor’s note: When this post was first published, the chart labels for “Non-Boom Counties” were incorrect; the labels have been corrected. (February 26, 12:00 pm)
The role of subprime mortgage lending in the U.S. housing boom of the 2000s is hotly debated in academic literature. One prevailing narrative ascribes the unprecedented home price growth during the mid-2000s to an expansion in mortgage lending to subprime borrowers. This post, based on our recent working paper, “Villains or Scapegoats? The Role of Subprime Borrowers in Driving the U.S. Housing Boom,” presents evidence that is inconsistent with conventional wisdom. In particular, we show that the housing boom and the subprime boom occurred in different places.
Continue reading "Did Subprime Borrowers Drive the Housing Boom?" »
Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Central Bank, Credit, Crisis, Economic History, Financial Institutions, Financial Markets, Household, Household Finance, Housing, Mortgages, Recession | Permalink | Comments (8)February 24, 2020
Understanding Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian Models: Insights from a PRANK
In recent years there has been a lot of interest in the effect of income inequality (heterogeneity) on the economy, from both academics and policymakers. Researchers have developed Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) models that incorporate heterogeneity and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk into the New Keynesian models that have become a cornerstone of monetary policy analysis. This research has argued that heterogeneity and idiosyncratic risk change many features of New Keynesian models – the transmission of conventional monetary policy, the forward guidance puzzle, fiscal multipliers, the efficacy of targeted transfers and automatic stabilizers, among others. However, the source of the difference between HANK and representative agent New Keynesian (RANK) models remains unclear. This is because HANK models are typically not analytically tractable, leaving it unclear what exactly is driving the results. To shed light on the macroeconomic consequences of heterogeneity, we develop a stylized HANK model that contains key features present in more complicated HANK models.
Continue reading "Understanding Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian Models: Insights from a PRANK" »
Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Central Bank, Credit, Federal Reserve, Financial Institutions, Fiscal Policy, Inequality, Macroecon, Monetary Policy, Recession, Systemic Risk | Permalink | Comments (0)July 08, 2019
From Policy Rates to Market Rates—Untangling the U.S. Dollar Funding Market
How do changes in the rate that the Federal Reserve pays on reserves held by depository institutions affect rates in money markets in which the Fed does not participate? Through which channels do changes in the so-called administered rates reach rates in onshore and offshore U.S. dollar money markets? In this post, we answer these questions with the help of an interactive map that guides us through the web of interconnected relationships between the Fed, key market players, and the various instruments in the U.S. dollar funding market, highlighting the linkages across the short-term financial products that form this market.
Continue reading "From Policy Rates to Market Rates—Untangling the U.S. Dollar Funding Market" »
Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Central Bank, Fed Funds, Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy, Repo | Permalink | Comments (5)May 17, 2019
Understanding Cyber Risk: Lessons from a Recent Fed Workshop
Cyber risk poses a major threat to financial stability, yet financial institutions still lack consensus on the definition of and terminology around cyber risk and have no common framework for confronting these hazards. This impedes efforts to measure and manage such risk, diminishing institutions’ individual and collective readiness to handle system-level cyber threats. In this blog post, we describe the proceedings of a recent workshop where leading risk managers, academics, and policy makers gathered to discuss proposals for countering cyber risk. This workshop is part of a joint two-phase initiative run by the Federal Reserve Banks of Richmond and New York and the Fed’s Board of Governors to harmonize cyber risk identification, classification, and measurement practices.
Continue reading "Understanding Cyber Risk: Lessons from a Recent Fed Workshop" »
Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Central Bank, Federal Reserve, Systemic Risk | Permalink | Comments (0)May 08, 2019
Ten Years Later—Did QE Work?
By November 2008, the Global Financial Crisis, which originated in the residential housing market and the shadow banking system, had begun to turn into a major recession, spurring the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to initiate what we now refer to as quantitative easing (QE). In this blog post, we draw upon the empirical findings of post-crisis academic research–including our own work–to shed light on the question: Did QE work?
Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Banks, Central Bank, Employment, Financial Markets, FOMC, Monetary Policy | Permalink | Comments (7)About the BlogLiberty Street Economics features insight and analysis from New York Fed economists working at the intersection of research and policy. Launched in 2011, the blog takes its name from the Bank’s headquarters at 33 Liberty Street in Manhattan’s Financial District.
The editors are Michael Fleming, Andrew Haughwout, Thomas Klitgaard, and Asani Sarkar, all economists in the Bank’s Research Group.
Liberty Street Economics does not publish new posts during the blackout periods surrounding Federal Open Market Committee meetings.
The views expressed are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the New York Fed or the Federal Reserve System.
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