19 posts on "Nonbank (NBFI)"
April 18, 2023
Monitoring Banks’ Exposure to Nonbanks: The Network of Interconnections Matters
The first post in this series discussed the potential exposure of banks to the open-end funds sector, by virtue of commonalities in asset holdings that expose banks to balance sheet losses in the event of an asset fire sale by these funds. In this post, we summarize the findings reported in a recent paper of ours, in which we expand the analysis to consider a broad cross section of non-bank financial institution (NBFI) segments. We unveil an innovative monitoring insight: the network of interconnections across NBFI segments and banks matters. For example, certain nonbank institutions may not have a meaningful asset overlap with banks, but their fire sales could nevertheless represent a vulnerability for banks because their assets overlap closely with other NBFIs that banks are substantially exposed to.
Enhancing Monitoring of NBFI Exposure: The Case of Open‑End Funds
Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) have grown steadily over the last two decades, becoming important providers of financial intermediation services. As NBFIs naturally interact with banking institutions in many markets and provide a wide range of services, banks may develop significant direct exposures stemming from these counterparty relationships. However, banks may be also exposed to NBFIs indirectly, simply by virtue of commonality in asset holdings. This post and its companion piece focus on this indirect form of exposure and propose ways to identify and quantify such vulnerabilities.
April 12, 2022
The Fed’s Balance Sheet Runoff: The Role of Levered NBFIs and Households
In a Liberty Street Economics post that appeared yesterday, we described the mechanics of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet “runoff” when newly issued Treasury securities are purchased by banks and money market funds (MMFs). The same mechanics would largely hold true when mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are purchased by banks. In this post, we show what happens when newly issued Treasury securities are purchased by levered nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs)—such as hedge funds or nonbank dealers—and by households.
Posted at 7:00 am in Central Bank, COVID-19 Facilities, Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy, Nonbank (NBFI) | Permalink | Comments (1)
September 1, 2021
Going with the Flow: Changes in Banks’ Business Model and Performance Implications
Does the performance of banks improve or worsen when banks enter into new business activities? And does it matter which activities a bank expands into, or retreats from, and when that decision is made? These important questions have remained unaddressed due to a lack of data. In a recent publication, we used a unique data set detailing the organizational structure of the entire population of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). In this post, we draw on that research to show that while scope expansion on average hurts performance, entering into activities that are highly synergistic with core banking at a given point in time yields net performance benefits.
Posted at 7:00 am in Bank Capital, Financial Institutions, Nonbank (NBFI) | Permalink | Comments (1)
October 2, 2018
Resolving “Too Big to Fail”
Many market participants believe that large financial institutions enjoy an implicit guarantee that the government will step in to rescue them from potential failure. These “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) issues became particularly salient during the 2008 crisis. From the government’s perspective, rescuing these financial institutions can be important to avoid harm to the financial system. The bailouts also artificially lower the risk borne by investors and the financing costs of big banks. The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to remove the incentive for governments to bail out banks in the first place by mandating that each large bank file a “living will” that details its strategy for a rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material distress or failure without disrupting the broader economy. In our recent New York Fed staff report, we look at whether living wills are effective at reducing the cost of implicit TBTF bailout subsidies.
Posted at 7:00 am in Crisis, Financial Institutions, Financial Intermediation, Nonbank (NBFI), Regulation, Systemic Risk | Permalink
October 1, 2018
Regulatory Changes and the Cost of Capital for Banks
In response to the financial crisis nearly a decade ago, a number of regulations were passed to improve the safety and soundness of the financial system. In this post and our related staff report, we provide a new perspective on the effect of these regulations by estimating the cost of capital for banks over the past two decades. We find that, while banks’ cost of capital soared during the financial crisis, after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA), banks experienced a greater decrease in their cost of capital than nonbanks and nonbank financial intermediaries (NBFI).
June 19, 2018
At the New York Fed: Conference on the Effects of Post‑Crisis Banking Reforms
Crump and Santos preview a New York Fed conference debating the efficacy of post-crisis banking reforms, looking at whether they have achieved their intended goals and considering the unintended consequences.
August 20, 2012
The Fed’s Emergency Liquidity Facilities during the Financial Crisis: The CPFF
This is the first post in a series that details the steps taken by the Fed in its role as lender of last resort during the 2007-09 financial crisis.
Posted at 9:48 am in Fed Funds, Financial Markets, Liquidity, Monetary Policy, Nonbank (NBFI) | Permalink
July 16, 2012
Introducing a Series on the Evolution of Banks and Financial Intermediation
It used to be simple: Asked how to describe financial intermediation, you would just mention the word “bank.”
Posted at 9:00 am in Banks, Financial Institutions, Financial Intermediation, Financial Markets, Nonbank (NBFI), Regulation | Permalink
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