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54 posts on "liquidity"
July 7, 2026

What Do Over 3,000 Bank Runs Teach Us About Banking Crises?

Black and white photo of a bank run on the American Union Bank which collapsed and went out of business on June 30, 1931.

Runs on financial institutions are one of the salient markers of financial crises. But the role of runs in crises is a topic of longstanding debate. Runs can be seen as the key turning point, whereby even small shocks can generate severe crises with widespread bank failures. Another view is that runs are mainly a symptom of deeper rot in the financial system, exacerbating crises rather than being their primary cause. Understanding this debate has first order implications for how to think about financial crises and the appropriate policy responses. In this post, we use a new database of more than 3,000 bank runs (introduced in our companion post) to show that poor fundamentals are central to explaining both when runs occur and when they have severe economic effects. We argue that this evidence tempers the view that small shocks can have outsized real effects through self-fulfilling run dynamics.

Using AI to Let History Speak About Bank Runs

Created image of an early 20th Century bank run with pink, blue and yellow flow concept. Querying, analysing, visualizing neural network for artificial intelligence. Data mining.

Banking crises are commonly associated with bank runs and banking panics, yet our empirical understanding of bank runs is constrained by a lack of bank-level data. In a new paper, we use large language models (LLMs) to extract information on bank runs from millions of digitized historical newspaper pages, creating the most comprehensive database of bank runs in U.S. history. Every bank run episode that we identify is documented on a companion website where users can browse and examine individual episodes, and read the original newspaper articles. In this post, we describe how we built this dataset and discuss what its basic features reveal.

June 30, 2026

Liquidity Fades as Treasuries Age

Germany and United States government bonds, yield and price information. Bond market trading, interest rates, treasury bonds, investment.

More than $30 trillion U.S. Treasury debt is outstanding. Less than 4 percent of this amount, which is associated with the most recently issued Treasuries, called on-the-run securities, accounts for 65 percent of average daily trading volume. The remaining portion of the amount outstanding is accounted for by seasoned issues that have been replaced by newer benchmarks, which are referred to as off-the-run securities. In this post, we review the key results in our paper that uses transaction-level Treasury TRACE data to study how trading activity and liquidity evolve as securities move from on-the-run to off-the-run. We show three main patterns. First, off-the-run notes and bonds rely much more on dealer-to-customer intermediation than benchmark securities. Second, trading activity falls sharply and transaction costs increase as securities age. Third, securities that are cheapest to deliver into Treasury futures are an important exception: they trade more actively than other off-the-run bonds of similar age.

Posted at 7:00 am in Liquidity, Treasury | Permalink | Comments (0)
April 16, 2026

Bank Failures: The Roles of Solvency and Liquidity

Photo of a long line of customers waiting to get into a Bank, open for the first time since the federal government takeover due to the bank's subprime mortgages with people with bad or no credit history.

Do banks fail because of runs or because they become insolvent? Answering this question is central to understanding financial crises and designing effective financial stability policies. Long-run historical evidence reveals that the root cause of bank failures is usually insolvency. The importance of bank runs is somewhat overstated. Runs matter, but in most cases they trigger or accelerate failure at already weak banks, rather than cause otherwise sound banks to fail.

Posted at 10:00 am in Bank Capital, Banks, Liquidity, Panic | Permalink
April 2, 2026

Treasury Market Liquidity Since April 2025

government bond yields trading board

In this post, we examine the evolution of U.S. Treasury market liquidity over the past year, which has witnessed myriad economic and political developments. Liquidity worsened markedly one year ago as volatility increased following the announcement of higher-than-expected tariffs. Liquidity quickly improved when the tariff increases were partially rolled back and then remained fairly stable thereafter (through the end of our sample in February 2026), including after the recent Supreme Court decision striking down the emergency tariffs and the subsequent announcement of new tariffs.

Posted at 7:00 am in Banks, Liquidity, Treasury | Permalink
November 12, 2025

How Has Treasury Market Liquidity Fared in 2025?

Interest rates concept. 3D illustration

In 2025, the Federal Reserve has cut interest rates, trade policy has shifted abruptly, and economic policy uncertainty has increased. How have these developments affected the functioning of the key U.S. Treasury securities market? In this post, we return to some familiar metrics to assess the recent behavior of Treasury market liquidity. We find that liquidity briefly worsened around the April 2025 tariff announcements but that its relation to Treasury volatility has been similar to what it was in the past.

Posted at 7:00 am in Financial Markets, Liquidity, Treasury | Permalink
October 1, 2024

Are Nonbank Financial Institutions Systemic?

Photo: dominoes spilling on a blue background.

Recent events have heightened awareness of systemic risk stemming from nonbank financial sectors. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, liquidity demand from nonbank financial entities caused a “dash for cash” in financial markets that required government support. In this post, we provide a quantitative assessment of systemic risk in the nonbank sectors. Even though these sectors have heterogeneous business models, ranging from insurance to trading and asset management, we find that their systemic risk has common variation, and this commonality has increased over time. Moreover, nonbank sectors tend to become more systemic when banking sector systemic risk increases.

September 24, 2024

End‑of‑Month Liquidity in the Treasury Market

Decorative Image: Portion of a calendar focusing on the 31st with a blue pushpin image

Trading activity in benchmark U.S. Treasury securities now concentrates on the last trading day of the month. Moreover, this stepped-up activity is associated with lower transaction costs, as shown by a smaller price impact of trades. We conjecture that increased turn-of-month portfolio rebalancing by passive investment funds that manage relative to fixed-income indices helps explain these patterns.

Posted at 7:00 am in Financial Markets, Liquidity, Treasury | Permalink
August 12, 2024

Reallocating Liquidity to Resolve a Crisis

Decorative photo of silver spigot on blackboard with dollar signs chalked on the board coming out of the spigot.

Shortly after the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in March 2023, a consortium of eleven large U.S. financial institutions deposited $30 billion into First Republic Bank to bolster its liquidity and assuage panic among uninsured depositors. In the end, however, First Republic Bank did not survive, raising the question of whether a reallocation of liquidity among financial institutions can ever reduce the need for central bank balance sheet expansion in the fight against bank runs. We explore this question in this post, based on a recent working paper.

Posted at 7:00 am in Banks, Crisis, Liquidity | Permalink
February 12, 2024

Measuring Treasury Market Depth

Decorative Image: image of 3 United States Savings Bonds.

A commonly used measure of market liquidity is market depth, which refers to the quantity of securities market participants are willing to buy or sell at particular prices. The market depth of U.S. Treasury securities, in particular, is assessed in many analyses of market functioning, including this Liberty Street Economics post on liquidity in 2023, this article on market functioning in March 2020, and this paper on liquidity after the Global Financial Crisis. In this post, we review the many measurement decisions that go into depth calculations and show that inferences about the evolution of Treasury market depth, and hence liquidity, are largely invariant with respect to these decisions. 

Posted at 7:00 am in Financial Markets | Permalink | Comments (1)
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