A New Indicator of Labor Market Tightness for Predicting Wage Inflation
A key question in economic policy is how labor market tightness affects wage inflation and ultimately prices. In this post, we highlight the importance of two measures of tightness in determining wage growth: the quits rate, and vacancies per searcher (V/S)—where searchers include both employed and non-employed job seekers. Amongst a broad set of indicators, we find that these two measures are independently the most strongly correlated with wage inflation. We construct a new index, called the Heise-Pearce-Weber (HPW) Tightness Index, which is a composite of quits and vacancies per searcher, and show that it performs best of all in explaining U.S. wage growth, including over the COVID pandemic and recovery.
Exposure to Generative AI and Expectations About Inequality
With the rise of generative AI (genAI) tools such as ChatGPT, many worry about the tools’ potential displacement effects in the labor market and the implications for income inequality. In supplemental questions to the February 2024 Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE), we asked a representative sample of U.S. residents about their experience with genAI tools. We find that relatively few people have used genAI, but that those who have used it have a bleaker outlook on its impacts on jobs and future inequality.
What Was Up with Grocery Prices?
The consumer price index for groceries has risen more than the overall price index since the start of the pandemic, with a particularly large jump in 2022. In looking for explanations, a starting place is the behavior of raw commodity prices, which surged from early 2021 to mid-2022. In addition, wages for low-paid grocery workers have gone up faster than wages for the workforce as a whole. Finally, even though profit margins for grocery stores have gone up, the increase appears to be only a small contributor to the rise in food prices relative to the increase in their operating costs. This analysis suggests that the significant moderation in food inflation since the start of 2023 is due to still-high wage inflation for grocery workers being offset by the retreat in commodity prices.
Do Unexpected Inflationary Shocks Raise Workers’ Wages?
The past year’s steady decline in nominal wage growth now appears in danger of stalling. Given ongoing uncertainty in Ukraine and the Middle East, this seems an opportune moment to revisit the conventional wisdom about the relationship between inflation and wages: if an unexpected increase in energy costs drives up the cost of living, will workers demand higher wages, reversing the recent moderation in wage growth? In new work with Justin Bloesch and Seung Joo Lee examining those concerns, our analysis shows that the pass-through of such inflationary shocks to wages is weak.
Pass‑Through of Wages and Import Prices Has Increased in the Post‑COVID Period
Annual CPI inflation reached 9.1 percent in June 2022, the highest reading since November 1981. The broad-based nature of the recent inflation readings has increased concerns that inflation may run above the Federal Reserve’s target for a longer period than anticipated. In this post we use detailed industry-level data to examine two prominent cost-push-based explanations for high inflation: rising import prices and higher labor costs. We find that the pass-through of wages and input prices to the U.S. Producer Price Index has grown during the pandemic. Both the large changes in these costs and a higher pass-through into domestic prices have contributed toward higher inflation.
Women’s Labor Force Participation Was Rising to Record Highs—Until the Pandemic Hit
Women’s labor force participation grew precipitously in the latter half of the 20th century, but by around the year 2000, that progress had stalled. In fact, the labor force participation rate for prime-age women (those aged 25 to 54) fell four percentage points between 2000 and 2015, breaking a decades-long trend. However, as the labor market gained traction in the aftermath of the Great Recession, more women were drawn into the labor force. In less than five years, between 2015 and early 2020, women’s labor force participation had recovered nearly all of the ground lost over the prior fifteen years. Then the pandemic hit, erasing these gains. In recent months, as the economy has begun to heal, women’s labor force participation has increased again, but there is much ground to be made up, especially for Black and Hispanic women. A strong labor market with rising wages, as was the case in the years leading up to the pandemic, will be instrumental in bringing more women back into the labor force.
What Is behind the Global Jump in Personal Saving during the Pandemic?
Household saving has soared in the United States and other high-income countries during the COVID-19 pandemic, despite widespread declines in wages and other private income streams. This post highlights the role of fiscal policy in driving the saving boom, through stepped-up social benefits and other income support measures. Indeed, in the United States, Japan, and Canada, government assistance has pushed household income above its pre-pandemic trajectory. We argue that the larger scale of government assistance in these countries helps explain why saving in these countries has risen more strongly than in the euro area. Going forward, how freely households spend out of their newly accumulated savings will be a key factor determining the strength of economic recoveries.
February Regional Business Surveys Find Widespread Supply Disruptions
Business activity increased in the region’s manufacturing sector in recent weeks but continued to decline in the region’s service sector, continuing a divergent trend seen over the past several months, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s February regional business surveys. Looking ahead, however, businesses expressed widespread optimism about the near-term outlook, with service firms increasingly confident that the business climate will be better in six months. The surveys also found that supply disruptions were widespread, with manufacturing firms reporting longer delivery times and rising input costs, a likely consequence of such disruptions. Many firms also noted that minimum wage hikes implemented in January in both New York and New Jersey had affected their employment or compensation decisions.
Job Training Mismatch and the COVID‑19 Recovery: A Cautionary Note from the Great Recession
Displaced workers have been shown to endure persistent losses years beyond their initial job separation events. These losses are especially amplified during recessions. (1) One explanation for greater persistence in downturns relative to booms, is that firms and industries on the margin of structural change permanently shift the types of tasks and occupations demanded after a large negative shock (Aghion et al. (2005)), but these new occupations do not match the stock of human capital held by those currently displaced. In response to COVID-19, firms with products and services that complement social-distancing (like Amazon distribution centers) may continue hiring during and beyond the recovery, while workers displaced from higher risk industries with more stagnant demand (for example, airport personnel, local retail clerks) are left to adjust to unfamiliar job opportunities. As some industries reopen gradually while others remain stunted, what role might workforce development programs have in bridging the skill gap such that displaced workers are best prepared for this new reality of work?
Some Places Are Much More Unequal than Others
Economic inequality in the United States is much more pronounced in some parts of the country than others. In this post, we examine the geography of wage inequality, drawing on our recent Economic Policy Review article. We find that the most unequal places tend to be large urban areas with strong economies where wage growth has been particularly strong for those at the top of the wage distribution.