8 posts on "Thu Pham"
June 3, 2026
The Unintended Effects of Interest Rate Caps: Credit Reallocation to Safer Borrowers
Several states have recently capped consumer loan rates with the stated purpose of protecting borrowers. In a recent Staff Report, we study how these interventions have played out in three states. In our first post about that study, we showed that rate caps lead riskier borrowers to face rationing in the credit market. One question that naturally arises is what lenders do with the credit they used to provide to high-risk borrowers before the caps were imposed. Lenders that lend exclusively to high-risk borrowers (at rates above the cap) may decide to stop lending to high-risk borrowers in that state. Others, however, may try to change their “credit box” by lending more to somewhat safer borrowers. In this post, we will try to understand how lenders reallocate credit after usury limits are implemented.
The Unintended Effects of Interest Rate Caps: Credit Rationing for Risky Borrowers
In imperial China, 3 percent was the maximum legal monthly loan rate; charging more was punishable by 40 to 100 blows with the “light cane.” (Rockoff 2003) Centuries later, many U.S. states are imposing the same cap (without corporal penalties) on alternative credit providers, such as payday, installment, and auto-title lenders, with the goal of lowering credit costs and delinquency for the high-risk borrowers that rely on these funding sources. A concern, however, is that lenders will simply refuse to lend to these borrowers at lower interest rates. Our recent Staff Report studies how interest rate caps have played out in several states that recently adopted them. Using household-level data from a major credit bureau, we find that loan balances for the riskiest borrowers declined substantially relative to counterparts in states without caps. Despite taking on less debt, these borrowers did not experience an improvement in delinquencies.
May 28, 2026
The Regional Side of the Story: K‑Shaped Pattern in Region, Wider Gap in Gas Spending
In this post, we use the inaugural release of our regional consumer spending indicators to ask whether these patterns hold for a significant portion of the Second District, and how regional spending patterns by income have been similar to or different from the national patterns we documented earlier. We find similar K‑shaped patterns in both retail and gas spending in our region as we do in the nation, with the K‑shaped pattern in gasoline in response to the recent gas price shock being more pronounced in the region.
May 1, 2026
Explaining the K‑Shaped Economy: What’s Behind the Divide?
In our companion post, we used a new module of our Economic Heterogeneity Indicators (EHIs) to shed light on how recent retail spending growth has been driven by high-income households. This fact is consistent with the popular press’s idea of a “K-shaped economy” in which higher-income households experience faster growth in spending than lower-income households. In this post, we dive deeper into the reasons behind this divergence by analyzing for which goods this trend holds true and ask whether it can be explained by changes in wages, inflation, or wealth. We find that, since 2023, wealth has increased the most for high-income households, while inflation has risen the most for low-income households, with both factors helping explain the fact that real retail spending rose the most for high-income households. In contrast, earnings display a more mixed pattern, though earnings of the highest earners have grown more rapidly than earnings of the lowest earners.
Posted at 10:01 am in Household Finance, Inequality, K-Shaped Economy, Microeconomics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tracking the K‑Shaped Economy: Who’s Driving Spending?
Aggregate real consumer spending has risen solidly since 2023. However, it is less clear how widely shared this improvement has been across all segments of society. This is important because systematic heterogeneity may mask the dependence of aggregate growth on a relatively small group of households and thus conceal macroeconomic risks. In this post, we use consumer spending data recently added to the Economic Heterogeneity Indicators (EHIs) and find that retail spending growth has been driven by high-income households—those earning more than $125,000 per year. In the popular press, the phenomenon of higher-income households growing at a faster rate than lower-income households has been referred to as the K-shaped economy. We find that consumption has exhibited a K-shaped economy since 2023, although not in the pre-COVID period or during the post-COVID recovery.
Posted at 10:00 am in Household Finance, Inequality, K-Shaped Economy, Microeconomics | Permalink | Comments (3)
February 3, 2026
A New Dataset for Consumer Spending in the New York Fed EHIs
We are enhancing our set of Economic Heterogeneity Indicators (EHIs) by adding a set of metrics on consumer spending with data presented by income, education, race and ethnicity, age, and urban status. The data will help track the evolution of aggregate behavior by analyzing the spending of specific groups in a more timely manner than is possible using public surveys.
January 12, 2026
Disability in the Labor Market: Earnings
In our previous post we learned that, in general, people with disabilities participate in the labor market at significantly lower rates, and that they are much more likely to be unemployed. Despite these patterns, we found that the labor force participation of workers with disabilities rose noticeably following the pandemic. A relevant question then is how earnings of workers with disabilities compare with workers without disabilities. In this companion post we investigate differences in weekly earnings for workers with and without disabilities. We find that workers with disabilities earn considerably less than workers without disabilities. Additionally, with few exceptions, their earnings have remained roughly constant in real terms since the pre-pandemic period.
Disability in the Labor Market: Employment and Participation
Among people in prime working age (25-54), around 7 percent have a disability of some kind. In this set of companion posts, we will examine how prime-aged workers with disabilities have fared in the labor market compared to the year prior to the pandemic. In this first post, we will show that people with disabilities are far less likely to be employed than people without disabilities, with both lower labor force participation and higher unemployment playing a role. We will also show that although employment rates of people with disabilities are very low, they have risen rapidly during the post-pandemic period, largely because of rising labor force participation. Our results are consistent with an increased prevalence of work from home (WFH) arrangements in the post-COVID period differentially benefiting people with disabilities.
Posted at 7:00 am in Labor Market | Permalink
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