The Unintended Effects of Interest Rate Caps: Credit Reallocation to Safer Borrowers
Rajashri Chakrabarti, Gabriel Leonard, Donald P. Morgan, Thu Pham, and Lee Seltzer
Several states have recently capped consumer loan rates with the stated purpose of protecting borrowers. In a recent Staff Report, we study how these interventions have played out in three states. In our first post about that study, we showed that rate caps lead riskier borrowers to face rationing in the credit market. One question that naturally arises is what lenders do with the credit they used to provide to high-risk borrowers before the caps were imposed. Lenders that lend exclusively to high-risk borrowers (at rates above the cap) may decide to stop lending to high-risk borrowers in that state. Others, however, may try to change their “credit box” by lending more to somewhat safer borrowers. In this post, we will try to understand how lenders reallocate credit after usury limits are implemented.
The Unintended Effects of Interest Rate Caps: Credit Rationing for Risky Borrowers
Rajashri Chakrabarti, Gabriel Leonard, Donald P. Morgan, Thu Pham, and Lee Seltzer
In imperial China, 3 percent was the maximum legal monthly loan rate; charging more was punishable by 40 to 100 blows with the “light cane.” (Rockoff 2003) Centuries later, many U.S. states are imposing the same cap (without corporal penalties) on alternative credit providers, such as payday, installment, and auto-title lenders, with the goal of lowering credit costs and delinquency for the high-risk borrowers that rely on these funding sources. A concern, however, is that lenders will simply refuse to lend to these borrowers at lower interest rates. Our recent Staff Report studies how interest rate caps have played out in several states that recently adopted them. Using household-level data from a major credit bureau, we find that loan balances for the riskiest borrowers declined substantially relative to counterparts in states without caps. Despite taking on less debt, these borrowers did not experience an improvement in delinquencies.
Struggling Regional Small Businesses Deeply Pessimistic About 2026 Prospects
Will Aarons and Asani Sarkar
We recently updated the suite of indicators describing the performance of small businesses in the Second District (defined, for the purpose of this study, as New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) and nationally with data from the 2025 edition of the Small Business Credit Survey (SBCS). In this post, we find that regional small businesses reported severe declines in employment and revenue growth in 2025 and became more pessimistic about growth in 2026. In contrast, small firms in the rest of the nation enjoyed stable revenues and employment in 2025 and, while they also had lower expectations of future growth, the decline was smaller in magnitude. Given the importance of small businesses in employment generation, analyzing such data helps to inform the design of effective monetary policy and to understand trends in the regional economy.
Remote Work Leaves Younger Workers Sidelined
Natalia Emanuel, Emma Harrington, and Amanda Pallais
Youth unemployment has risen dramatically since the pandemic—as has the prevalence of remote work. Our analysis suggests that these trends are related, with remote work making it more difficult for managers to train and mentor new employees. Accordingly, companies may be reluctant to hire less-experienced workers in distributed work arrangements. We estimate that remote work can explain 64 percent of the recent increase in unemployment among young college graduates. Further, the timing of this surge suggests that remote work—not generative AI—explains the bulk of the rise in youth unemployment.
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