260 posts on "Financial Institutions"
October 12, 2011
Short‑Term Debt, Rollover Risk, and Financial Crises
One of the many striking features of the recent financial crisis was the sudden “freeze” in the market for the rollover of short-term debt.
Posted at 7:00 am in Credit, Crisis, Financial Institutions, Financial Markets, Inflation | Permalink
October 11, 2011
Did the Fed’s Term Auction Facility Work?
We argue that the Fed’s Term Auction Facility (TAF), introduced in December 2007, lowered the cost of borrowing of banks in the market during the recent financial crisis.
August 31, 2011
Is There Stigma to Discount Window Borrowing?
The Federal Reserve employs the discount window (DW) to provide funding to fundamentally solvent but illiquid banks (see the March 30 post “Why Do Central Banks Have Discount Windows?”). Historically, however, there has been a low level of DW use by banks, even when they are faced with severe liquidity shortages, raising the possibility of a stigma attached to DW borrowing. If DW stigma exists, it is likely to inhibit the Fed’s ability to act as lender of last resort and prod banks to turn to more expensive sources of financing when they can least afford it. In this post, we provide evidence that during the recent financial crisis banks were willing to pay higher interest rates in order to avoid going to the DW, a pattern of behavior consistent with stigma.
July 11, 2011
Global Banks and Their Internal Capital Markets during the Crisis
As financial markets have become increasingly globalized, banks have developed growing networks of branches and subsidiaries in foreign countries. This expansion of banking across borders is changing the way banks manage their balance sheets, and the ways home markets and foreign markets respond to disturbances to financial markets. Based on our recent research, this post shows how global banks used their foreign affiliates for accessing scarce dollars during the financial crisis—a liquidity strategy that helped transmit shocks internationally while reducing some of the consequences in the stressed locations.
May 25, 2011
Stress Test Success and Bank Opacity
In contemplating the recent financial panic, it is easy to get lost in the weeds of repo markets and asset-backed securities and lose sight of the fact that, at the fundamental level, the panic was about inadequate information. Investors were uncertain about what particular assets were worth, and they were uncertain about which banks were exposed to those assets and to what degree. They were also uncertain about how the government would handle undercapitalized banks. It was against this background that the Treasury announced in February 2009 that the nineteen largest U.S. bank holding companies would be subject to an unprecedented stress test to determine if the banks had sufficient capital to survive and maintain lending in the event of a worse-than-expected recession. In this post, I discuss a recent New York Fed staff report that I wrote with Stavros Peristiani and Vanessa Savino that provides evidence that the stress test supplied new information to the market, and thus may have helped quell the panic.
May 23, 2011
Valuing the Capital Assistance Program
The Capital Assistance Program (CAP) was announced on February 10, 2009, in a joint statement by the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision outlining a financial stability plan.
The Capital Assistance Program (CAP) was announced on February 10, 2009, in a joint statement by the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision outlining a financial stability plan. The first phase of the plan called for a stress test to assess the capital needs of nineteen major U.S. financial institutions in the event of a worse-than-expected recession. In the second phase, banks requiring additional capital that were unable to raise sufficient private capital would sell to the Treasury convertible preferred securities and warrants on common shares. The combination of the stress test, which provided information about the downside risk faced by the largest U.S. banks, and the CAP securities, which provided backup capital to mitigate this downside risk, was an unprecedented regulatory response to a financial crisis. In this post, we discuss the valuation of CAP securities. The valuation described in our 2009 New York Fed staff report is aligned with the stock market reaction to the announcement of the CAP terms.
April 13, 2011
Why Did U.S. Branches of Foreign Banks Borrow at the Discount Window during the Crisis?
To help contain the economic damage caused by the recent financial crisis, the Federal Reserve extended large amounts of liquidity to financial firms through traditional lending facilities such as the discount window as well as through newly designed facilities. Recently released Federal Reserve data on discount window borrowing show that some U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks were among the most active users of the window. In this post, we explain why U.S. branches borrow at the discount window. We also discuss two main reasons why these branches had a large need for dollars during the crisis and how discount window loans to them helped stabilize the financial system and the real economy in the United States.
Posted at 10:00 am in Banks, Fed Funds, Financial Institutions, Monetary Policy | Permalink | Comments (2)
April 4, 2011
CoVaR: A Measure of Systemic Risk
Wonk alert: technical content — During the 2007-09 financial crisis, we saw that losses spread rapidly across institutions, threatening the entire financial system. Distress spread from structured investment vehicles to traditional deposit-taking banks and on to investment banks, and the failures of individual institutions had outsized impacts on the financial system. These spillovers were realizations of systemic risk—the risk that the distress of an individual institution, or a group of institutions, will induce financial instability on a broader scale, distorting the supply of credit to the real economy. In this post, we draw on our working paper “CoVaR”—issued in the New York Fed’s Staff Reports series—to do two things: first, propose a new measure of systemic risk and, second, outline a method that can help bring about the early detection of systemic risk buildup.
Posted at 10:00 am in Crisis, Fed Funds, Financial Institutions, Financial Markets, Regulation, Systemic Risk | Permalink
March 30, 2011
Why Do Central Banks Have Discount Windows?
Though not literally a window any longer, the “discount window” refers to the facilities that central banks, acting as lender of last resort, use to provide liquidity to commercial banks. While the need for a discount window and lender of last resort has been debated, the basic rationale for their existence is that circumstances can arise, such as bank runs and panics, when even fundamentally sound banks cannot raise liquidity on short notice. Massive discount window borrowing in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack on the United States clearly illustrates the importance of a discount window even in a modern economy. In this post, we discuss the classical rationale for the discount window, some debate surrounding it, and the challenges that the “stigma” associated with borrowing at the discount window poses for the effectiveness of the discount window.
Posted at 10:03 am in Banks, Central Bank, Financial Institutions, Lender of Last Resort | Permalink
March 28, 2011
How Were the Basel 3 Minimum Capital Requirements Calibrated?
One way to reduce the likelihood of bank failures is to require banks to hold more and better capital. But how much capital is enough? An international committee of regulators recently reached a new agreement (called Basel 3) to impose new, higher standards for capital on globally active banks. The Basel 3 common equity minimum capital requirement will be 4.5 percent plus an additional buffer of at least 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets (RWA). Are these numbers big or small—and where did they come from? In this post, I describe how the new Basel capital standards were calibrated.
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