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143 posts on "Financial Institutions"

May 16, 2016

Did the Supervisory Guidance on Leveraged Lending Work?



LSE_Did the Supervisory Guidance on Leveraged Lending Work?

Financial regulatory agencies issued guidance intended to curtail leveraged lending—loans to firms perceived to be risky—in March of 2013. In issuing the guidance, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation highlighted several facts that were reminiscent of the mortgage market in the years preceding the financial crisis: rapid growth in the volume of leveraged lending, increased participation by unregulated investors, and deteriorating underwriting standards. Our post shows that banks, in particular the largest institutions, cut leveraged lending while nonbanks increased such lending after the guidance. During the same period of time, nonbanks increased their borrowing from banks, possibly to finance their growing leveraged lending activity.

Continue reading "Did the Supervisory Guidance on Leveraged Lending Work?" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions | Permalink | Comments (2)

May 05, 2016

Borrowing, Lending, and Swapping Collateral in GCF Repo®



Borrowing, Lending, and Swapping Collateral in GCF Repo®

In the third post in this series, we examined GCF Repo® traders’ end-of-day strategies. In this final post, we further our understanding of dealers’ behavior by looking at their trading pattern within the day.

Continue reading "Borrowing, Lending, and Swapping Collateral in GCF Repo®" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions, Financial Markets | Permalink | Comments (0)

May 04, 2016

Why Dealers Trade in GCF Repo®



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In this post, the third in a series on GCF Repo®, we describe dealers’ trading strategies. We show that most dealers exhibit highly regular strategies, using the GCF Repo service either to borrow or to lend, on net, on almost all the days in which they are active. Moreover, dealers’ strategies are highly persistent over time: Dealers that use GCF Repo to borrow (or to lend) in a given quarter are highly likely to continue to do so in the following quarter. Understanding how dealers trade in the GCF Repo market may provide insight about the role of the repo market more generally and about how recent regulations and market reforms can affect dealers’ trading strategies.

Continue reading "Why Dealers Trade in GCF Repo®" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions, Financial Markets | Permalink | Comments (0)

April 18, 2016

What’s behind the March Spike in Treasury Fails?



U.S. Treasury security settlement fails—whereby market participants are unable to make delivery of securities to complete transactions—spiked in March 2016 to their highest level since the financial crisis. As noted in this post, fails delay the settlement of transactions and can therefore lead to illiquidity, create operational risk, and increase counterparty credit risk. Fails in the Treasury market attract particular attention because of the market’s key role for global investors as a pricing benchmark, hedging instrument, and reserve asset. So what drove the March spike? In this post, we show that much of it reflected sequential fails of benchmark ten-year notes and thirty-year bonds, but that fails in seasoned issues—which have been trending upward for several years—were also elevated.

Continue reading "What’s behind the March Spike in Treasury Fails?" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions | Permalink | Comments (4)

April 14, 2016

A Peek behind the Curtain of Bank Supervision



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Since the financial crisis, bank regulatory and supervisory policies have changed dramatically both in the United States (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) and abroad (Third Basel Accord). While these shifts have occasioned much debate, the discussion surrounding supervision remains limited because most supervisory activity— both the amount of supervisory attention and the demands for corrective action by supervisors—is confidential. Drawing on our recent staff report “Parsing the Content of Bank Supervision,” this post provides a peek behind the scenes of bank supervision, presenting a statistical linguistic analysis based on confidential communications from Fed supervisors to the banks they supervise. Our analysis tackles several fundamental questions: What are the precise supervisory issues being raised? What drives the issues supervisors bring up? How does bank supervision relate to the other two pillars of the Basel Accord: capital regulations and market discipline?

Continue reading "A Peek behind the Curtain of Bank Supervision" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions | Permalink | Comments (0)

April 13, 2016

How Does Supervision Affect Banks?



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Supervisors monitor banks to assess the banks’ compliance with rules and regulations but also to ensure that they engage in safe and sound practices (see our earlier post What Do Banking Supervisors Do?). Much of the work that bank supervisors do is behind the scenes and therefore difficult for outsiders to measure. In particular, it is difficult to know what impact, if any, supervisors have on the behavior of banks. In this post, we describe a new Staff Report in which we attempt to measure the impact that supervision has on bank performance. Does more attention by supervisors lead to lower risk at banks and, if so, at what cost to profitability or growth?

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Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions | Permalink | Comments (0)

April 12, 2016

The Economics of Bank Supervision: So Much to Do, So Little Time



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While bank regulation and supervision are the two main components of banking policy, the difference between them is often overlooked and the details of supervision can appear shrouded in secrecy. In this post, which is based on a recent staff report, we provide a framework for thinking about supervision and its relation to regulation. We then use data on supervisory efforts of Federal Reserve bank examiners to describe how supervisory efforts vary by bank size and risk, and to measure key trade-offs in allocating resources.

Continue reading "The Economics of Bank Supervision: So Much to Do, So Little Time" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions | Permalink | Comments (0)

April 11, 2016

Supervising Large, Complex Financial Institutions: Defining Objectives and Measuring Effectiveness



Supervising Large, Complex Financial Institutions: Defining Objectives and Measuring Effectiveness

Last month the New York Fed held a conference on supervising large, complex financial institutions. The event featured presentations of empirical and theoretical research by economists here, commentary by academic researchers, and panel discussions with policymakers and senior supervisors. The conference was motivated by the recognition that supervision is distinct from regulation, but that the difference between them is often not well understood. The discussion focused on defining objectives for supervising the large, complex financial companies that figure so prominently in our financial system and ways of measuring how effectively supervision achieves these goals. This post summarizes the key themes from the conference and introduces the more in-depth posts that will follow in this blog series.

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Posted by Blog Author at 10:07 AM in Financial Institutions | Permalink | Comments (0)

April 06, 2016

Bank Regulation and Bank Complexity



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U.S. Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) currently control about 3,000 subsidiaries that provide community housing services—such as building low-income housing units, maintaining shelters, and providing housing services to the elderly and disabled. This aspect of U.S. BHC activity is intriguing because it departs from the traditional deposit-taking and loan-making operations typically associated with banks. But perhaps most importantly, the sheer number of these subsidiaries makes one think about the organizational complexity of U.S. BHCs. This is an issue that has generated much discussion in recent years. In this post we describe the emergence and growth of community housing subsidiaries and discuss to what extent they contribute to the complexity of their parent organizations.

Continue reading "Bank Regulation and Bank Complexity" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions, Housing | Permalink | Comments (0)

April 04, 2016

Are Stress Tests Still Informative?



Are Stress Tests Still Informative?

Since the height of the financial crisis, each year the Federal Reserve has disclosed the results of its stress tests, and stress testing has become “business as usual” in the U.S. banking industry. In this post, we assess whether market participants find supervisory stress test disclosures informative. After half a decade, do the disclosures still contain information that the market finds valuable?

Continue reading "Are Stress Tests Still Informative?" »

Posted by Blog Author at 7:00 AM in Financial Institutions | Permalink | Comments (0)
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