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Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee, Wilbert
van der Klaauw, and Joelle Scally
This morning, the New York Fed released its Quarterly
Report on Household Debt and Credit for 2013 Q1.
The report uses the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel to show that outstanding
household debt declined approximately $110 billion (about 1 percent) from the
previous quarter. The drop was due in large part to a reduction in
housing-related debt and credit card balances. Meanwhile, delinquency rates for
each form of consumer debt declined, with the overall ninety-plus day
delinquency rate dropping from 6.3 percent to 6.0 percent.
According to the most recent Empire State Manufacturing Survey, manufacturing conditions are continuing to improve in New York State, but only barely. The headline general business conditions index from the April 2013 report was 3.1—down 6 points from March and not much above zero. The positive reading indicates that activity is growing, though its decline suggests that the pace of growth has slowed. Employment indexes, however, climbed higher and suggested a modest increase in hiring and hours worked. It will be particularly important to see how next month’s report turns out to get a clearer sense of whether regional manufacturing conditions are getting better or if the slow growth signaled by the past few reports is fizzling out.
Households in the New York-northern New Jersey region were spared the worst of the housing bust and have generally experienced less financial stress than average over the past several years. However, as the housing market has begun to recover both regionally and nationally, the region is faring far worse than the nation in one important respect—a growing backlog of foreclosures is resulting in a foreclosure rate that is now well above the national average. In this blog post, we describe this outsized increase in the region’s foreclosure rate and explain why it has occurred. We then discuss why the large build-up in foreclosures could cause a headwind for home-price gains in the region.
The February Indexes of Coincident Economic Indicators (CEIs) for New York State, New York City, and New Jersey released today show activity expanding at a moderate pace across the region. Like those for January, the February CEIs incorporate the annual benchmark employment revisions for 2011 and 2012, and reveal that the economies of the region did not go off track as a result of the disruptions caused by Superstorm Sandy. (A recent blog post explores the employment effects of Sandy in the New York City metropolitan area.)
Jaison R. Abel, Jason Bram, Richard Deitz, and
James Orr
Last
October, Superstorm Sandy caused widespread destruction and massive disruptions
to the regional economy, not to mention the lives of millions of residents. More
than three months later, many people remain displaced, and some are still struggling
to rebuild their homes, businesses, and lives. Despite these setbacks, the
process of economic recovery in the region appears to be well underway, boosted
by the beginning of the cleanup and restoration process. In this post, we take
an initial look at the adverse impact Sandy has had on the region’s jobs,
describing the nature and extent of the employment downturn and the subsequent rebound
following the storm.
Fiscal stimulus, in the form of large discretionary
increases in federal spending and tax reductions, is often triggered by a strong
and persistent rise in the national unemployment rate. The most recent example was
the $860 billion (6 percent of GDP) stimulus contained in the 2009 American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), adopted in the context of rising
unemployment rates. The spending components of the program were varied, including
federal transfers to state governments to support education and social
services, assistance to unemployed and disadvantaged individuals, and funds for
capital construction projects. The majority of the stimulus funds were
allocated to state governments and, since the program was motivated by high and
rising aggregate unemployment, a reasonable expectation would have been that
states with high unemployment rates would receive large allocations. Our analysis of the distribution of ARRA funds across states shows that the expanded
assistance to unemployed workers was indeed highly correlated with state
unemployment rates. It turned out, however, that most other state allocations
had little association—positive or negative—with state unemployment rates. The ultimate
distribution instead seemed to reflect a number of practical considerations
involved in implementing such a vast spending program. In this post, we outline
what in our view were the key considerations that governed the distribution of
the stimulus spending across states, and we use the example of one component of
that spending—highway infrastructure investment—to illustrate how the stimulus
funds got to the states.
In the state of New Jersey, any child between the ages of five and eighteen has the constitutional right to a thorough and efficient education. The state also has one of the country’s most rigid policies regarding a balanced budget. When state and local revenues took a big hit in the most recent recession, officials had to make tough decisions about education spending. In this post, we analyze education financing and spending in two groups of high-poverty districts during the Great Recession and the ARRA (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009) federal stimulus period—the Abbott and Bacon districts. Analysis in our recent New York Fed staff report shows that the Abbott districts exhibited the sharpest declines—relative to trend—in both total funding and total spending per pupil during the post-recession era. Additionally, the Abbott districts were the only group of districts in New Jersey to present statistically significant negative shifts in instructional spending, even with the federal stimulus.
U.S. households accumulated record-high levels of debt in the 2000s, and then began a process of deleveraging following the Great Recession and financial crisis. In some parts of the country, the rise and fall in household indebtedness was quite a bit sharper than in others. In this post, we highlight some of our research examining the magnitude of the recent credit cycle, and focus on how significant it’s been in New York State and northern New Jersey. Compared with the nation as a whole, we find that the region experienced a relatively mild credit cycle, although pockets of elevated household financial stress exist.
Jaison R. Abel, Jason Bram, Richard Deitz, and James Orr
Superstorm Sandy caused damage and disruption to a wide swath of the New
York-New Jersey region. The high winds and storm surge resulted in significant
physical damage to residential property, commercial real estate, and the power
and transportation infrastructure. Everyday activities such as commuting,
shopping, and traveling were impeded or in some cases prevented. As a number of
communities across the region continue to cope with the damage and ongoing
disruptions, there’s concern about if and when activity will return to normal.
Jaison R. Abel, Jason Bram, Richard Deitz, and James Orr
While the full extent of the harm caused by superstorm Sandy is still unknown, it’s clear that the region sustained significant damage and disruption, particularly along the coastal areas of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. As we describe earlier in this series, the economic costs associated with natural disasters are generally thought to arise from the damage and destruction of physical assets and the loss of economic activity. These costs can be substantial, running into the tens of billions, and impose significant stress on the affected communities. In this post, we assess who will ultimately pay the economic costs imposed by the storm. Based on data from recent hurricane events, it is likely that the federal government and private insurance companies will more than cover the aggregate costs. In the short run, though, there may be strains on state and local governments as well as on individuals and businesses as they await reimbursement.